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NOTE
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3) and the
Criminal Defendant: The Limits of the
Hillmon Doctrine
Nobody should condemn the exclusionary legal rules of evidence until
he has fully mastered their purposes and their practical effects. Hence
from the very beginning a student of evidence must accustom himself
to dealing as wisely and understandingly as possible with principles
which impede freedom of proof. He is making a study of calculated
and supposedly helpful obstructionism.'
I. INTRODUCTION
In a criminal trial, any evidence that aids the jury in its role as
the trier of fact is "relevant" because anything that makes guilt or
innocence more probable than not serves the ultimate purpose of a
trial.2 A primary function of the rules of evidence, however, is to
withhold relevant but incompetent evidence from the jury, which
consequently protects the defendant from a potentially erroneous
verdict.3 The rule that excludes as incompetent all hearsay state-
ments reflects this tension between the desire to present all rele-
vant evidence and the occasional need to prohibit it. Generally, a
hearsay statement is considered incompetent evidence because the
declarant does not make it in the presence of the jury, and there-
fore, he is not subject to cross-examination contemporaneous with
the declaration.4 Exceptions to this rule of obstruction developed
at common law for certain types of evidence that were necessary to
a fair trial and that had some indicia of reliability or circumstan-
1. J. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE: COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW 10-11 (1947).
2. Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence defines relevant evidence as "having any
tendency to make the existence of a fact that is of consequence to determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EVID.
401.
3. See generally C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE,
579-86 (2d ed. 1972); 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 800-10 to -18
(1979).
4. Id.
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tial guarantees of trustworthiness, which allayed the traditional
fears normally associated with hearsay. The Federal Rules of Evi-
dence codified this common-law system of a general exclusionary
rule with exceptions.5 In a recent decision regarding a challenge to
an exception to the hearsay rule, the Supreme Court arguably im-
munized this system from constitutional attack under the confron-
tation clause.6
One exception to the rule against hearsay, codified by rule
803(3) of the Federal Rules of Evidence,7 has its common-law roots
in the 1892 Supreme Court decision of Mutual Life Insurance Co.
v. Hillmon.8 In Hilimon the Court ruled that statements by a de-
clarant of his intention to perform a subsequent act are admissible
both as direct and circumstantial evidence under the state-of-mind
exception to the rule against hearsay.9 Consequently, under this
exception the jury not only may consider such a statement as di-
rect proof that the declarant possessed the then-existing state of
mind to perform the subsequent act, but also may consider the
statement as circumstantial proof to support the inference that the
declarant actually performed the intended act. The effectuation of
the intended conduct by the declarant in Hillmon, however, re-
quired the cooperation of a third party. The Court failed to rec-
ognize the additional inference necessary to reach the ultimate
conclusion that the future conduct expressed in the hearsay state-
ments was indeed performed: that the third party was willing to
participate, and that he did participate, in the intended conduct
with the declarant.
Unique dangers arise when statements of future intent by the
declarant that fall within the parameters of the Hillmon doctrine
inplicate the conduct of a third party who is the defendant in a
trial for the murder of the declarant. Under the common-law
Hillmon doctrine, the prosecution may use statements by the de-
clarant of his intention to meet the defendant as circumstantial
evidence to prove that the meeting took place. Notwithstanding
limiting instructions, 0 the prosecution's real purpose in offering
5. FED. R. EVID. art. VIII.
6. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). The confrontation clause states, "In all crimi-
nal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses
against him." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
7. For the text of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3), see infra text accompanying note
92.
8. 145 U.S. 285 (1892).
9. Id. at 295-96.
10. The court gives a limiting instruction to the jury when a declarant's statement
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these statements as evidence is to prove circumstantially that the
defendant also intended to meet the deceased declarant and that
the meeting provided an opportunity or motive for the murder.
When the alleged meeting and the time of the murder coincide,
these statements may be overwhelming evidence against the defen-
dant. This Note examines the application of the Hillmon doctrine
in this context. Part II analyzes the theoretical foundation of this
exception to the rule against hearsay developed in Hillmon. Sec-
tion A identifies briefly the underlying policy of the rule against
hearsay. Section B discusses the facts and holding of Hillmon, and
section C explores the potential applications of the Hilimon doc-
trine. Part III considers rule 803(3), which codified the common-
law Hilimon doctrine, and examines the conflicting statements of
legislative intent that leave unanswered the question whether the
exception applies to hearsay statements that implicate the conduct
of a third party. Part IV examines the case law to determine how
courts have applied rule 803(3). Finally, part V discusses the safe-
guards various courts have used when confronted with these state-
ments, and suggests that courts which are unwilling to limit
Hillmon should adopt similar guidelines to ensure that the hearsay
statements at least bear some indicia of reliability. 1
II. THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATION OF THE Hilimon DOCTRINE
A. The Rule Against Hearsay
The rule against hearsay has withstood many years of intense
scrutiny and criticism by the courts and legal scholars.12 Although
several commentators have recommended the abandonment of this
rule of exclusion in favor of a rule of admission of all hearsay evi-
implicates the defendant's conduct. This instruction directs the jury to consider the state-
ment as proof of the declarant's conduct but not as proof of the defendant's conduct. See
infra notes 73-80 and accompanying text.
11. In Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), the Court stated that it "has applied this
'indicia of reliability' requirement principally by concluding that certain hearsay exceptions
rest upon such solid foundations that admission of virtually any evidence with them com-
ports with the 'substance of the constitutional protection.'" Id. at 66.
12. The literature on the rule against hearsay is abundant. For some of the major law
review works discussing the rule, see e.g., Maguire, The Hearsay System: Around and
Through the Thicket, 14 VAND. L. REv. 741 (1961); McCormick, The Borderland of Hear-
say, 39 YALE L.J. 489 (1929); Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay
Concept, 62 HAnv. L. REV. 177 (1948); Morgan & Maguire, Looking Backward and Forward
at Evidence, 50 HARv. L. REV. 909 (1937); Morgan, A Suggested Classification of Utter-
ances Admissible as Res Gestae, 31 YALE L.J. 229 (1922).
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dence subject only to the discretion of the trial judge,"3 the codifi-
cation of the common-law rule and its exceptions in the Federal
Rules of Evidence 14 ensures its continued vitality.15 The Federal
13. Irving Younger stated recently that "the hearsay theory has taken on a shape un-
gainly and ill-proportioned." Younger, Reflections on the Rule Against Hearsay, 32 S.C.L.
REv. 281, 282 (1980). Based upon a "flawed attempt" to determine through a LEXIS search
how often the rule against hearsay results in the exclusion of evidence, Younger concluded
that "Ithere is no rule against hearsay [because] [h]earsay is usually admitted." Id. at 293.
Characterizing the hearsay rule as "only a rule against unreliable evidence," id., Younger
proposed the following modification: "Hearsay is admissible. . . unless the court decides as
a preliminary question that the hearsay could not be accepted by the finder of fact as trust-
worthy. The finder of fact remains free to disbelieve admitted hearsay." Id.
In 1961 then Professor Jack Weinstein proposed this same rule of judicial discretion.
See Weinstein, Symposium-Hearsay Evidence: Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IowA L.
REv. 331 (1961). To provide adequate safeguards for the opponent of hearsay evidence
under a discretionary approach, Weinstein suggested that the proponent of hearsay give
advance notice to his opponent of his intent to introduce the evidence at trial, id. at 340,
that the opportunity of the trial judge to "comment freely on the weight of such evidence
should be recognized," id. at 341, and that "[m]ore explicit recognition of the power of ap-
pellate courts in evaluating hearsay should also be recognized if a new hearsay approach is
adopted." Id. Observing that trial courts admit most hearsay, Weinstein noted, "[S]o quick-
ly has the exclusionary power of the hearsay rule waned that there are few cases today
where the outcome of a well-tried case would have been different had it not been for the
hearsay rule, where a good court was prevented from admitting persuasive hearsay." Id. at
343.
Two student notes have questioned the policy justifications for the rule against hearsay.
See Note, The Theoretical Foundation of the Hearsay Rules, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1786, 1787
(1980) (courts should abolish rule against hearsay because it exhibits great mistrust for the
jury system and because it serves simply to maintain "acceptable external appearances for
our system of adjudication"); Note, Abolish the Rule Against Hearsay, 35 U. Pirr. L. REv.
609, 627 (1974) ("the power of the courts to pass upon the weight and sufficiency of the
evidence" and other similar safeguards will exist after the abolition of the rule).
In a footnote to his majority opinion in Ohio v. Roberts, however, Justice Blackmun
stated,
The complexity of reconciling the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rules has trig-
gered an outpouring of scholarly commentary. . . . Notwithstanding this divergence of
critical opinion, we have found no commentary suggesting that the Court has misiden-
tified the basic interests to be accommodated. Nor has any commentator demonstrated
that prevailing analysis is out of line with the intentions of the Framers of the Sixth
Amendment. Convinced that "no rule will perfectly resolve all possible problems,"...
we reject the invitation to overrule a near-century of jurisprudence. Our reluctance to
begin anew is heightened by this Court's implicit prior rejection of principal alternative
proposals . . . ; the mutually critical character of the commentary; and the Court's
demonstrated success in steering a middle course among proposed alternatives.
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 n.9 (1980) (citations omitted).
14. FED. R. EvID. art. VIII.
15. Arguments in favor of the codification of the rule excluding hearsay and its numer-
ous exceptions include the predictability and certainty the rule provides litigants and the
standards it establishes for trial judges and appellate courts. The Supreme Court arguably
"constitutionalized" the exceptions to the rule against hearsay in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S.
56 (1980), by essentially holding that these exceptions were coextensive with the sixth
amendment. See infra text accompanying notes 29-34.
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Rules of Evidence define hearsay as "a statement, other than the
one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing,
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." '
Four dangers plague the reliability of hearsay evidence: the poten-
tial ambiguity of the statement, and the insincerity, erroneous
memory, and faulty perception of the declarant. 7 Therefore, all
hearsay under both the common law and the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence is inadmissible as evidence unless specifically excepted.18
The exceptions to the rule against hearsay evolved as common-law
trial courts perceived a need for hearsay evidence that had some
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.1" The essential pur-
pose of the rule, then, is to exclude inherently unreliable
evidence.2 0
Professor Tribe developed a model to "aid in the analysis of
the hearsay rule and its exceptions by exposing the rule's structure
and the underlying values at stake. ' 2 1 Tribe characterized the
hearsay dilemma as a "problem. .. of forging a reliable chain of
inferences, from an act or utterance of a person not subject to con-
temporaneous in-court cross-examination about that act or utter-
ance, to an event that the act or utterance is supposed to reflect.122
To illustrate this concept, Tribe developed his "Testimonial
Triangle":28
B (belief of declarant)
(1) ambiguity 1(3) erroneous memory
(2) insincerity (4) faulty perception
A C
(action or (conclusion to
utterance) which B points)
16. FzD. R. EVm. 801(c). A "statement" under the Federal Rules of Evidence is "(1) an
oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by him as an
assertion." Fan. R. EVID. 801(a).
17. See, e.g., Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HARv. L. Rnv. 957 (1974).
18. Federal Rules of Evidence 803 and 804 contain twenty-seven enumerated excep-
tions to the rule against hearsay.
19. See authorities cited supra note 3.
20. Id.
21. Tribe, supra note 17, at 957.
22. Id. (emphasis added). This "chain of inferences" concept is especially important to
the analysis of hearsay evidence under the Hillmon doctrine and rule 803(3). See infra notes
61-85 and accompanying text.
23. Id. at 959. Professor Tribe used this device as an aid in his course on evidence at
Harvard. Id. at 961 n.1.
1982] 663
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The line along the base of the triangle (from A to C) repre-
sents the usual form of testimony: the jury witnesses the declar-
ant's action or utterance and reaches a conclusion. Reading the
Triangle from A to B (the "left leg") and then from B to C (the
"right leg"), Tribe stated, "When 'A' is used to prove 'C' along a
path through 'B,' a traditional hearsay problem exists and the use
of the act or assertion as evidence is disallowed upon proper objec-
tion in the absence of some special reason to permit it."'24 The fol-
lowing hypothetical illustrates the application of the Triangle to a
hearsay statement. Assume that an issue at trial is whether John
went to the Downtown Cinema on Friday night, but John is un-
available to testify. At the trial Mary testifies that John made the
following statement to her on Saturday morning: "I went to the
movie last night." 5 The statement is hearsay because the propo-
nent is offering it to prove the truth of the matter asserted: that
John went to the movies on Friday night. This statement may be
used as circumstantial proof that John went to the Downtown Cin-
ema. Point A on the Triangle represents the statement. To permit
the jury to reach the step represented by B-that John believed he
went to the movies on Friday night-risks the dangers of ambigu-
ity and insincerity. Although John stated that he went to the mov-
ies, his statement is ambiguous because he may not have gone to
the Downtown Cinema, especially if he could have chosen from
more than one theatre. His statement could be insincere because
he .may have had some motive to deceive Mary. Even if certain
circumstances exist that alleviate these dangers represented by the
left leg of the Triangle, the conclusion represented by the right leg
of the Triangle-that because John believed he went to the movies
on Friday night he must therefore have actually done so-raises
the dangers of erroneous memory and faulty perception. First, be-
cause John's statement referred to past conduct, the length of time
24. Id.
25. Professor Payne used a similar statement as an example to support his contention
that under certain circumstances courts should admit hearsay statements referring to past
conduct by extending the application of the Hillmon doctrine. See Payne, The Hillmon
Case-An Old Problem Revisited, 41 VA. L. REv. 1011 (1955). He stated the example as
follows: "Now we consider the use of statements to establish memory or belief which is to be
used as circumstantial evidence of prior conduct .... Suppose a material fact in a given
case is whether or not A went to the movies on Sunday. A is not available at trial." Id. at
1023 (emphasis in original). Weinstein and Berger's treatise also cited this example and
quoted Professor Payne's analysis of his hypothetical. See 4 J. WmNSTEIN & M. BRGER,
supra note 3, at 803-110 to -112. For a discussion of whether courts should admit statements
pointing toward past conduct, see infra notes 199-224 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 35:659664
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between the conduct and his statement threatens the reliability of
his memory. Second, the jury cannot evaluate the accuracy of
John's perception of his conduct because he is unavailable. Fur-
thermore, the lack of opportunity to cross-examine John about his
conduct that Friday night-whether he in fact went to the Down-
town Cinema-exacerbates the risk of admitting his statement into
evidence. And yet, the statement made by John may be the only
relevant evidence tending to prove whether he did or did not go to
the Downtown Cinema.
In keeping with the common-law tradition, the Federal Rules
of Evidence do not except statements that refer to past conduct,
such as John's statement, from the rule against hearsay.26 The hy-
pothetical discussed above illustrates the tension that has charac-
terized the evolution of the exclusionary system of hearsay evi-
dence. Courts developed exceptions to the rule against hearsay
when the need for such evidence outweighed certain dangers. 7 If
admission of the statement does not risk one or more of the four
dangers traditionally associated with hearsay, the courts created a
categorical exception because that type of statement bears some
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness or indicia of reliabil-
ity that warrant disregard of the general rule of exclusion.2 8
The Supreme Court in Ohio v. Roberts29 recognized that the
question of the admissibility of hearsay under this scheme of ex-
ceptions requires a weighing of "competing interests."30 The Court
26. FED. R. EVID. 803(3). This exception states that it does not include "a statement of
memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution,
revocation, identification, or terms of the declarant's will." Id. The Advisory Committee
stated that this limitation was "necessary to avoid the virtual destruction of the hearsay
rule which would otherwise result." For discussion and analysis of this policy, see infra part
III.
27. See authorities cited supa note 12.
28. Tribe, supra note 17, at 961-69. Professor Tribe divided the exceptions to the rule
against hearsay into three groups. Those exceptions in Group I are "grounded upon the
existence of an adequate procedural substitute for in-court cross-examination contempora-
neous with the statement or action involved." Id. at 961 (emphasis in original). The Group
II exceptions are "based on the view that there exist situations in which a party has no right
to cross-examine with respect to particular testimony." Id. at 963 (emphasis in original).
Tribe's Group III contains most of the rule 803 exceptions, including the Hillmon doctrine
as codified by rule 803(3). These exceptions are "justified by specific attributes of the out-
of-court act or utterance which are thought to reduce the triangle's weaknesses so substan-
tially that the balance of untrustworthiness and likelihood of probative value favors admis-
sibility of the evidence." Id. at 964. In other words, the Group III exceptions represent the
balancing approach approved by the Court in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). See infra
notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
29. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
30. Id. at 64.
1982] 665
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identified the defendant's interests, in confronting the witnesses
against him at trial and in cross-examining them as a "means of
testing accuracy."' 1 The Court noted that the Government's inter-
est in producing hearsay statements against the defendant includes
the need for the evidence, the "strong interest in effective law en-
forcement, ' s2 and "the need for certainty in the workaday world of
conducting trials."33 The Court defined the formula for resolving
this balancing analysis:
In sum, when a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at
trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he is un-
available. Even then, his statement is admissible only if it bears adequate
"indicia of reliability." Reliability can be inferred without more in a case
where evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other
cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent a showing of particular-
ized guarantees of trustworthiness."'
This Note next examines the Hillmon doctrine-a "firmly rooted"
hearsay exception codified by rule 803(3).
B. Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Hillmon
Evidence of a person's state of mind can be relevant at trial
under many varied circumstances.3 5 This Note examines only one
31. Id. The Court noted that cross-examination tests the demeanor, sincerity, and
oath of the declarant before the jury. Id. at 63 n.6.
32. Id. at 64.
33. Id. at 66.
34. Id. (emphasis added).
35. State-of-mind evidence has seven possible uses:
(1) The declarant may testify concerning his own state of mind at a prior time. This
testimony is not hearsay.
(2) Statements made by the declarant may be admissible for circumstantial use to
prove the declarant's state of mind at the time of his declaration. The classic example
of this use of state-of-mind evidence is the declaration, "I am Napoleon." Whether this
statement is or is not hearsay has been the subject of debate among the commentators.
See 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 3, at 803-97. The justification for the
admission of this statement is that the proponent does not offer the statement to prove
that the declarant was Napoleon (i.e., the truth of the matter asserted); instead the
proponent offers it as evidence of the declarant's state of mind (i.e., that the declarant
thought he was Napoleon). A discussion of this type of statement is beyond the scope
of this Note.
(3) Under the verbal act doctrine, if the declarant's non-verbal conduct is ambiguous,
statements that accompany that conduct and explain or otherwise allow the trier of
fact to interpret it are admissible as non-hearsay. See C. McCoRMIcK, supra note 3, at
589. Statements that accompany the actor's non-verbal conduct often may reveal his
state of mind and therefore are relevant in explaining that conduct. For example, if the
witness testifies that he saw the declarant hand X $1000 and state, "This money settles
our debt," the jury reasonably may infer that the declarant intended the money to
retire a preexisting debt to X.
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use of state-of-mind evidence: the state of mind of the declarant
not in issue 6 but nevertheless relevant first to prove his intent at
the time of the declaration that indicated his then-existing state of
mind, and second to prove circumstantially that he acted in con-
formity with that declaration. 37 A statement exhibiting the declar-
ant's then-existing state of mind is hearsay if the proponent offers
it to prove the truth of the matter asserted: that the declarant pos-
sessed the intent expressed in his declaration.
In 1892 the Supreme Court in Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Hillmon38 developed a common-law exception to the rule against
hearsay to allow this type of state-of-mind declaration into evi-
dence. Commonly called the Hillmon doctrine, the exception and
the theoretical difficulties inherent in its application at the trial
level have sparked controversy and criticism among commenta-
tors. 9 From "Witchita, March 1, 1879," a man named Walters
(4) When the declarant's state of mind is in issue, the rule against hearsay does not
apply. This exception developed because a person's state of mind often can be proved
only through the declarant's own testimony (example (1) supra) or through statements
he made contemporaneously with the conduct in issue. For example, statements to
prove such states of mind as "motive, affection or alienation, or ill-will or intent" are
admissible when state of mind is in issue. 4 J. WEnsTIN & M. BERGER, supra note 3,
803-99 to -103. Rule 803(3) codified this common-law exception.
(5) Even when not in issue, the state of mind of the declarant nevertheless may be
relevant to prove circumstantially that he subsequently acted in conformity with his
expressed intention. The proponent offers this testimony for a hearsay use but the
common-law Hillmon doctrine and rule 803(3) except it from the hearsay rule. The
declarant's statement evidences his "then existing state of mind." This type of state-of-
mind evidence is the topic of this Note.
(6) A declaration of a past event may reveal the declarant's then-existing belief that
the past event occurred; nonetheless, the statement is inadmissible as hearsay because
it points backwards in time. See Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96 (1933); FED. R.
EvID. 803(3); infra part III.
(7) Similarly, a declaration of past mental state falls within the rule against hearsay.
4 J. WEINSTmn & M. BERGER, supra note 3, at 803-94 to -98.
36. Rule 803(3) excepts from the rule against hearsay a statement offered to prove
state of mind in issue. Discussion of this exception is beyond the scope of this Note. For an
example of this exception, see supra example (4) in note 35.
37. See supra example (5) in note 35.
38. 145 U.S. 285 (1892). Courts and commentators often cite Hillmon for its holding
that a court may overrule the objection of an insurance company and order the consolida-
tion of claims against different insurers on the same life. See id. at 292-94.
39. See, e.g., Hinton, States of Mind and the Hearsay Rule, 1 U. CM. L. REv. 394
(1934); Hutchins & Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence-State of Mind
To Prove An Act, 38 YALE L.J. 283 (1929); Maguire, The Hillmon Case-Thirty-Three
Years After, 38 HARv. L. REv. 709 (1925); Payne, The Hillmon Case-An Old Problem Re-
visited, 41 VA. L. REV. 1011 (1955); Rice, The State of Mind Exception to the Hearsay
Rule: A Response to "'Secondary' Relevance," 14 DuQ. L. Rav. 219 (1976); Seidelson, The
State of Mind Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 13 DuQ. L. REv. 251 (1974); Seligman, An
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wrote his fianc6e in Fort Madison to inform her that "I am going
with a man by the name of Hillmon"40 because Hillmon promised
him wages and a free trip.41 The letter indicated that part of their
route would take them through Colorado.2 On "March 4th or 5th
or 3d or 4th-I don't know-1879," Walters wrote his sister and
"all" in Fort Madison, "I expect to leave Wichita on or about
March the 5th, with a certain Mr. Hillmon, a sheeptrader, for
Colorado or parts unknown to me."'4' Two weeks later on March
18, 1879, an "accidental discharge of a gun"'44 killed a man at
Crooked Creek, Kansas, and he fell into a campfire, which burned
his face and prevented a positive identification.45 Mrs. Hillmon,
the beneficiary of three life insurance policies taken out by
Hillmon, claimed the body was that of her husband.4" The insur-
ance company, however, claimed that the body was Walters, and
introduced at trial the letters to his fiancee and his sister as evi-
dence tending to place both him and Hillmon together in the vi-
cinity of Crooked Creek on the night of the shooting.47 The insur-
ance company hoped to prove that Hillmon killed Walters in a plot
to defraud the company into paying the policies on his life while he
remained in hiding.48 The trial court ruled that this evidence was
Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 26 HARV. L. REV. 146 (1912). For an interesting account of
this storied case, see MacCracken, The Case of the Anonymous Corpse, AMERICAN HERI-
TAGE, June 1968, at 51.
40. 145 U.S. at 288.
41. Id. The letter stated, "I get to see the best portion of Kansas, Indian Territory,
Colorado, and Mexico." Id. at 289.
42. Id. at 288.
43. Id. Since this letter was lost the insurance company could not introduce it, but
Walters' sister stated "that she remembered and could state the contents of the letter." Id.
at 287. Although the trial judge sustained the objection to the sister's testimony, the trial
court preserved her testimony for the record.
44. Id. at 287.
45. MacCracken, supra note 39, at 52.
46. Id. at 286-87. Mrs. Hillmon contended that John H. Brown accompanied Mr.
Hillmon to Crooked Creek. Id. at 286. The Court summarized Mrs. Hillmon's proof as
follows:
At the trial the plaintiff introduced evidence tending to show that on or about March 5,
.1879, Hillmon and Brown left Wichita... and travelled together through Southern
Kansas in search for a cattle ranch; that on the night of March 18, while they were in
camp at a place called Crooked Creek, Hillmon was killed by the accidental discharge
of a gun; that Brown at once notified persons living in the neighborhood; and that the
body was thereupon taken to a neighboring town, where after an inquest, it was buried.
Id. at 286-87.
47. Id. at 287. Walters' fiancee and sister also testified "that during that time his fam-
ily frequently received letters from him, the last of which was written from Wichita; and
that he had not been heard from since March, 1879." Id.
48. Id. at 286. The insurance company alleged that Hillmon,
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inadmissible "as memoranda in the ordinary course of business. 4 9
At oral argument before the Supreme Court, counsel for the insur-
ance company apparently first stated that an alternative ground
for admission of the letters was "state of mind or feeling" evi-
dence.5 0 The Court ruled that
[tihe letters in question were competent, not as narratives of facts communi-
cated to the writer by others, . . but as evidence that, shortly before the
time when other evidence tended to show that [Walters] went away, [Wal-
ters] had the intention of going, and of going with Hillmon, which made it
more probable both that he did go and that he went with Hilimon, than if
there had been no proof of such intention.' 1
The Court, however, failed to acknowledge that because its ruling
allowed the jury to accept the letters as circumstantial proof that
Walters actually carried out his stated intention, the jury also logi-
cally could accept the same evidence as circumstantial proof that
Hillmon intended to go with Walters on the trip through Kansas.
The Hillmon decision is replete with nineteenth-century lan-
guage that translates into a twentieth-century holding.52 The Court
cited several facts warranting admission of the letters. First, evi-
dence of Walters' intentions during early March was relevant.5 3
Second, other admissible evidence corroborated Walters' intention
as stated in his letters." Third, Walters' intention was a material
fact to the case.55 Fourth, because Walters was dead and thus un-
available to testify, the Court cited the great need for the only
together with John H. Brown and divers other persons, on or before November 30,
1878, conspiring to defraud the defendant, procured the issue of all the policies, and
afterwards, in March and April, 1879, falsely pretended and represented that Hillmon
was dead, and that a dead body which they had procured was his, whereas in reality he
was alive and in hiding.
Id.
49. Id. at 295. The Court upheld this ruling. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 295-96 (emphasis in original).
52. This "translation" parallels the analytical framework that many modern courts
have applied to the Hillmon doctrine in criminal cases. See infra part V.
53. The Court stated that the letters were evidence of "a material fact bearing upon
the question in controversy." Hilmon, 145 U.S. at 299-300.
54. The Court stated, "Evidence that just before March 5 [Walters] had the intention
of leaving Wichita with Hillmon would tend to corroborate the evidence already admitted,
and to show that he went from Wichita to Crooked Creek with Hillmon." Id. at 295. This
evidence supported the contention that Walters was in Witchita "on or about March 5,"
that he "had not been heard from since," and that the body was Walters. Id. at 294.
55. The Court noted in several passages of the opinion that Walters' intention was a
material fact. For example, the Court stated, "whenever the intention is of itself a distinct
and material fact in a chain of circumstances, it may be proved by contemporaneous oral or
written declarations." Id. at 295.
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other available evidence tending to prove his intentions." Fifth,
the circumstances surrounding the letters indicated that they were
trustworthy.57 Last, admission of the letters risked no prejudicial
effect on the jury."
In summary, the Hillmon doctrine states that a declaration of
a then-existing intent to perform a subsequent act is admissible as
evidence of the declarant's state of mind at the time of the decla-
ration to perform that act, and that declaration also may serve as
circumstantial evidence to prove inferentially that the declarant
acted in conformity with his stated intention." The application of
this seemingly simple concept has proved to be a difficult task for
the courts. The possible variations of the exception and its poten-
tial effect upon the outcome of a trial prompted Professor Maguire
to comment that the Hillmon doctrine "involve[s] distinctions of a
refinement better suited to the philosophical laboratory than to
the hurly-burly of a jury trial."60 This Note next examines the pos-
sible applications of then-existing state-of-mind evidence under
the Hillmon doctrine and applies the Testimonial Triangle to the
exception to expose the dangers inherent in the use of this type of
evidence.
C. Theoretical Applications of the Hillmon Doctrine
Four potential applications of then-existing state-of-mind evi-
dence may occur at trial. Variations of the statements in Hillmon61
56. The Court apparently assumed that even if the body were not Walters, most likely
he was dead because of his long absence from home.
57. Several circumstances justified the conclusion that the letters were trustworthy.
"Letters from [Walters] to his family and his betrothed were the natural, if not the only
attainable, evidence of his intention." Hillmon, 145 U.S. at 295. Thus, Walters had no ap-
parent motive to lie. The Court noted also that while Walters was alive, "his own memory of
his state of mind at a former time is no more likely to be clear and true than a bystander's
recollection of what he then said, and is less trustworthy than letters written by him at the
very time and under circumstances precluding a suspicion of misrepresentation." Id.
58. The Court stated, "In view of the mass of conflicting testimony introduced upon
the question whether it was the body of Walters that was found in Hillmon's camp, this
evidence might properly influence the jury in determining that question." Id. at 296 (em-
phasis added).
59. Id. at 298.
60. Maguire, supra note 39, at 731. In applying the common-law Hillmon doctrine to a
statement implicating the defendant charged with the declarant's murder, the majority in
United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1976), noted "the theoretical awkwardness
associated with the application of the Hillmon doctrine to facts such as those now before us,
[but] the authority in favor of such an application is impressive, beginning with the seminal
Hillmon decision itself." Id. at 377.
61. See supra notes 35-60 and accompanying text. Professor Tribe altered the facts in
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in the following hypothetical illustrates these uses: An issue in the
case is whether Hillmon and Walters met in Crooked Creek on a
certain day but both are unavailable to testify. The insurance com-
pany offers a letter from Walters to his fiancee as proof of Walters'
state of mind at the time he wrote the letter and as circumstantial
evidence that Walters was in Crooked Creek, Kansas, on the day in
question. The letter contained one of the following statements:
(1) The Declarant's Prior Act-"I returned from Crooked
Creek today";
(2) A Third Party's Prior Act Implicated-"I returned from
Crooked Creek today with Mr. Hillmon";
(3) The Declarant's Subsequent Act---"I will leave tomorrow
for Crooked Creek";
(4) A Third Party's Subsequent Act Implicated-"I will leave
tomorrow for Crooked Creek with Mr. Hillmon."
Each of these statements requires inferential reasoning by the trier
of fact. First, the jury must accept the statement as credible and
trustworthy evidence of the declarant's then-existing state of mind.
Next, if the jury thus views the statement, it also may accept the
inference that the conduct to which the statement refers occurred.
1. The Declarant's Prior Act
The statement "I returned from Crooked Creek today" con-
tains traditional hearsay dangers. The first step in determining
whether this statement is trustworthy is to examine Walters' asser-
tion and the significance that the jury may attach to it in view of
the statement's potential problems of ambiguity and insincerity."2
Arguably the statement is simple enough to alleviate any fears of
ambiguity. The danger of insincerity is also not so great if the jury
reasonably may assume that Walters had no reason to deceive his
fiancee. If, however, Walters knew that deception would further his
interest in the litigation, then the danger of insincerity threatens
Hillmon by positing a statement by Walters' fiancee that "she was planning to meet him in
Crooked Creek." Tribe, supra note 15, at 971 (emphasis in original). Tribe demonstrated
that although this statement appears to face forward, it "is relevant only because it ex-
presses an implied belief that she will meet Walters when she carries out her intention, a
belief that points backward to the conclusion that past events had given her reason to ex-
pect him to be there." Id. Notes 199-224 infra and accompanying text discuss the difficulty
of determining in which direction a statement points-to past acts or subsequent conduct.
62. These dangers comprise the left leg of the Testimonial Triangle. See supra notes
22-24 and accompanying text.
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the trustworthiness of this out-of-court declaration. The next
step is to examine the dangers of erroneous memory and faulty
perception inherent in Walters' apparent belief in the truth of his
statement and the jury's conclusion by inference that he had been
to Crooked Creek. Because the statement refers to past conduct,
these dangers are particularly acute. The statement on its face has
no circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness since Walters
based it on his memory of participation in a past event. Thus,
under traditional hearsay analysis, this statement is inadmissible
as hearsay.
Several commentators, however, have concluded that because
Hillmon admitted statements of intent pointing toward future con-
duct, if other circumstances indicate that a statement which points
toward past conduct is trustworthy, then logically it should be ad-
missible under the Hillmon Court's rationale. 5 Professor Payne
63. See Payne, supra note 25, at 1024.
64. This analysis examines the dangers defined by the right leg of the Testimonial
Triangle. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
65. Discussion of the potential applications of the Hillmon doctrine began in 1912
with Professor Seligman's article in the Harvard Law Review. See Seligman, supra note 39.
Seligman contended that the logical application of the Hillmon doctrine demands that
statements of then-existing state of mind pointing toward past conduct also not fall within
the rule against hearsay. He feared that this extension of the doctrine would result in the
admissibility of all hearsay evidence. See id. at 157. Seligman concluded that the necessity
of admitting statements of then-existing state of mind does not exist when such statements
serve only as circumstantial evidence. He reasoned that if "declarations of intention are
admissible to prove a future act, logically they would be admissible to prove a past act," and
"logically declarations of a present belief as to a past act would be admissible to prove a
past act." Id. at 156. Therefore, "if hearsay declarations are admissible to prove past acts of
the speaker, it would seem logically necessary to admit them in order to prove past facts of
his observation." Id. at 157. Accordingly, Seligman concluded that a consistent application
of the Hillmon reasoning results in the "abolition of the hearsay rule." Id. To avoid this
result, Seligman recommended the eschewal of the Hillmon doctrine. Id. at 160.
Professor Maguire disagreed with Seligman's conclusions in a 1925 article. See Maguire,
supra note 39. Maguire asserted that "even [Seligman] might well concede that in its ordi-
nary, workaday application the [Hillmon] principle leads to more good than evil .... Ana-
lytically, the principle appears much more safely boxed in than Mr. Seligman believed. The
same assertion may be ventured on an empirical basis." Id. at 731. Maguire also concluded
that the extension of the Hillmon doctrine to include statements pointing toward past acts
risks too many hearsay dangers. Id. at 721-23; see supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
In 1929 Hutchins and Slesinger proposed the extension of the Hillmon doctrine to in-
clude declarations of prior acts if the declarant is unavailable and adequate corroboration
exists to ensure some circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. See Hutchins & Sles-
inger, supra note 39, at 294. They argued that because an exception at common law allowed
statements of prior acts when the validity of the decedent declarant's will was in issue,
[t]here is no logical or psychological reason for not extending the rule to cover all state-
ments made either subsequent to or contemporaneous with the act in issue. The words
are not cause or effect of the main act; they are part of the total situation, with a
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argued that if the statement referred to a single act and the declar-
ant made it shortly after the completion of that act with no appar-
ent motive to falsify, the court should admit the statement under
the Hilimon doctrine." Accordingly, under Payne's analysis Wal-
ters' statement arguably is admissible as an exception to the rule
against hearsay.17 The potential ambiguity and insincerity of this
statement is the same under either traditional hearsay analysis or
the Payne approach. Problems of perception and memory are less
severe, however, because Walters' statement occurred the same day
that he ostensibly arrived from Crooked Creek. Indeed, following
this reasoning, statements of memory are more reliable when these
reasonably high probability of correlation with the other parts. Since the probability is
only reasonably high, it might be misleading to admit the statements without corrobo-
ration. But when corroborated they are just as valuable, whether referring to past, pre-
sent or future.
Id. at 295. The authors suggested that part of this corroboration should consist of a psycho-
analytic examination of the declarant and the context of his statements to "be able to differ-
entiate cases where the probable correlation between words and other overt acts is high
from those where it is low, or possibly negative," id. at 297. They concluded that the court
"should be wary of accepting the statements at their face value." Id. at 298.
In a 1934 article Professor Hinton agreed with Maguire that
[i]f the courts should sanction the inference from the recollection of the unsworn ob-
server to the reality of the thing remembered, they would practically abolish the hear-
say rule altogether, because the most positive assertion of a past fact or event, if really
made on personal knowledge, amounts to a shorter way of saying "I remember that I
perceived thus and so." The state of mind called memory is thus proved by the state-
ment of it.
Hinton, supra note 39, at 423.
More than twenty years later Professor Payne contended that statements pointing to-
ward past conduct should be admissible because
[i]f we limit the reception of the evidence. . . to declarations made at a time when the
declarant had no apparent motive to falsify, the evidence.., would seem to be just as
trustworthy as, and indeed more cogent than, the evidence admitted under the doctrine
of the Hillmon case.
Payne, supra note 25, at 1024.
66. Professor Payne utilized this formula in his 1955 article. See Payne, supra note 25,
at 1023-24. Payne posited the following.
Suppose a material fact in a given case is whether or not A went to the movies on
Sunday. A is not available at trial. Under the doctrine of the Hillmon case, W would be
permitted to testify that on Saturday he was witness to A's declarations of intention to
attend the movies on the following day. . . . Seligman argues that logically W should
be permitted to testify that on Monday he was witness to A's declarations that A had
been to the movies on the previous day.
Id. at 1023. Payne concluded that the Hillmon doctrine should include trustworthy state-
ments of past conduct as an exception to the rule against hearsay. For a discussion of this
theory, see infra notes 199-224 and accompanying text.
67. Payne, supra note 25, at 1023-24. Payne "urg[ed] the abandonment of the effort to
apply the conjectural and metaphysical distinctions sometimes involved in keeping the
Hillmon doctrine in its place." Id. at 1057. Instead, he "advocates by way of substitution
a simple rule of judicial discretion." Id.
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circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness exist than are state-
ments that point toward future conduct because "intervening cir-
cumstances"6 8 or "alteration of intention""9 may have thwarted
that conduct.
2. A Third Party's Prior Act Implicated
The statement "I returned from Crooked Creek today with
Mr. Hilmon" poses many of the same traditional hearsay dangers
as the first statement. The analysis of this statement, however, is
more complex because its use as evidence not only allows the jury
to conclude that Walters had visited Crooked Creek, but also per-
mits two additional inferences: Walters was with Hillmon in
Crooked Creek, and he travelled with Hillmon on his return trip.
The analysis of possible ambiguity and insincerity is the same as
that for a statement which points only toward the declarant's prior
conduct. 0 If the court is to admit this statement implicating the
conduct of Hillmon as an exception, then Walters' perception and
memory of both his conduct and the conduct of a third party must
be trustworthy. Under the traditional common-law analysis the
danger of the declarant's faulty memory outweighs any potential
guarantees of trustworthiness, and the statement therefore is not
admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule.
Professor Payne contended that "conceivably there are in-
stances where an observer would be in a better position to perceive
and remember than the actor or a participant in the conduct ob-
served. 7 1 If surrounding circumstances tend to bolster the trust-
worthiness of Walters' statement that implied he was with HiUmon
at Crooked Creek, Payne would admit the statement as evidence
68. Tribe first used this term. See Tribe, supra note 17, at 971. Payne called this same
concept "frustration of intention." See Payne, supra note 25, at 1027.
69. Payne first used this term. See supra note 25, at 1027. Tribe called this concept
"change of mind." See Tribe, supra note 17, at 971.
70. See supra text accompanying notes 62-69.
71. Payne, supra note 25, at 1028. Payne asked, "Is the declarant apt to perceive and
remember more accurately when the perception and memory relate to his own conduct or to
acts in which he was a participant than when they relate to conduct or a condition or state
of affairs with reference to which he was merely an observer?" Id. Concluding that "each
case must turn on its own facts," id., Payne cited the following "flimsy example" to illus-
trate the difficulty of generalization:
It might be argued. . . that the parties to a marriage ceremony are apt to perceive and
remember more accurately than an observer the time and details of the event. Suppose,
though, the observer is a parent of one of the parties-say the traditionally disturbed
mother of the bride. Would the argument still prevail?
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that Walters and Hillmon were in Crooked Creek at the same
time.72
3. The Declarant's Subsequent Act
The statement "I will leave tomorrow for Crooked Creek"
reveals Walters' state of mind at the time of the assertion to carry
out his intention at a future date. If the court admits the state-
ment, the jury may use it to infer that Walters left for Crooked
Creek the next day; this inference makes the conclusion that he
arrived in Crooked Creek more probable than not. The hearsay
dangers inherent in this statement differ from those that accom-
pany statements pointing toward past conduct.
The dangers of ambiguity and insincerity do not change in
this situation."3 Because this statement points toward future con-
duct, however, the traditional hearsay problems of erroneous mem-
ory and faulty perception are not apparent. Instead, two new dan-
gers arise: the possibility that intervening circumstances prevented
Walters from carrying out his intention or that Walters changed
his then-existing intention to travel to Crooked Creek.74 These new
dangers warrant the revision of the Testimonial Triangle as
follows:7 5
B (belief of declarant)
(1) ambiguity (3) intervening circumstances
(2) insincerity (4) alteration of intention
(action or (conclusion to
utterance) which B points)
72. Professor Payne noted that in at least two exceptions to the rule against hear-
say-excited utterances and dying declarations--"the very circumstances that supposedly
promote veracity are apt to weaken seriously the declarant's perception and memory." Id. at
1028-29. He asserted that sincerity is perhaps the most important standard courts consider
when confronted with hearsay declarations during trial. Id. at 1029.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 62-64.
74. See Payne, supra note 25, at 1027; Tribe, supra note 17, at 971.
75. Professor Tribe applied the Hillmon exception to his Testimonial Triangle in this
manner. See Tribe, supra note 17, at 971. He stated, "The triangle on which the infirmities
of 'intervening circumstances' and 'change of mind' replace memory and perception on the
right leg is at least as untrustworthy as the Testimonial Triangle itself." Id.
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This statement of intention to perform an act in the future is
admissible under the common-law exception developed in
Hillmon. 6 The traditional justification for this exception is the
unique need associated with state-of-mind evidence.77 Moreover,
the jury arguably can recognize that the declarant's out-of-court
statement of intent to perform a subsequent act is not sufficient
evidence by itself to prove that he actually performed the act. 8
Accordingly, the jury should give this type of hearsay statement
less credibility because intervening circumstances or alteration of
intent may have precluded the effectuation of the declarant's in-
tended conduct. Courts often attempt to confine the impact of
these statements of intent by employing limiting instructions. 9 In
addition, because this type of hearsay statement is only circum-
stantial evidence, ostensibly its use is solely to corroborate other
evidence that the declarant actually performed the act indicated
by his stated intention.8
4. A Third Party's Subsequent Act Implicated
The statement "I will leave tomorrow for Crooked Creek with
Mr. Hillmon," like the statement in the third example, reveals
Walters' intention to leave for Crooked Creek at a future date.
When considering this statement, however, the jury may infer not
only that Walters carried out that intention but also that Hillmon
accompanied him. Additionally, the jury reasonably may infer that
Hillmon was willing to go, and that he did go, with Walters to
Crooked Creek. The analysis of potential hearsay dangers in this
situation parallels the discussion of the hearsay dangers of state-
76. See supra notes 38-58 and accompanying text.
77. See supra note 35.
78. See Payne, supra note 25, at 1024. Payne recognized "the substantial danger that
the average juror might be less perceptive of the defects involved in the hearsay assertion
[of past facts] than of those [statements of intention of subsequent conduct] involved in the
circumstantial reasoning in the Hilimon situation." Id. Notwithstanding this conclusion,
Payne rejected "drawing a semiarbitrary line between" these different statements because
"perceptive judicial containment of the Hilimon doctrine along these lines seems a slim
possibility." Id. at 1024-25.
79. For an example of a limiting instruction, see infra text accompanying note 166.
80. Evidence corroborating the subsequent act evidenced by a statement of future in-
tention alleviates the dangers of intervening circumstances and alteration of intent. For ex-
ample, a witness's testimony that he saw Walters in Crooked Creek near the time indicated
by his statement enhances the statement's trustworthiness. A curious anomaly results, how-
ever, since availability of corroborative evidence diminishes the need for the hearsay state-
ment. For a discussion of corroboration and its effects, see infra notes 234-42 and accompa-
nying text.
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ments of intention that implicate only the declarant's future con-
duct."1 Because the effectuation of Walters' intention required
Hillmon's cooperation, the dangers of intervening circumstances or
alteration of intent arguably are greater.8 2 Moreover, this state-
ment standing alone does not provide any circumstantial guarantee
that Hillmon intended to go with Walters to Crooked Creek.
Under the common-law Hillmon doctrine, however, this statement
is admissible to prove circumstantially that Walters carried out his
stated intention.
The deletion of the reference to Hillmon or a limiting instruc-
tion confining the jury's consideration of the statement to the con-
duct of the declarant Walters could control the statement's im-
pact.83 In many cases, however, excising any reference to the third
party would render a statement meaningless to the jury and thwart
the very purpose for which the proponent offered it: to allow the
jury to draw the inference that the third party acted in conformity
with the declarant's intention.' On the other hand, when the im-
plicated third party is the defendant in a criminal case, a limiting
instruction is of dubious value in confining the jury's consideration
of the statement solely to the declarant's act.85 Notwithstanding a
limiting instruction, the jury will consider the statement as direct
evidence of the third party's alleged conduct.
Part IH examines the policy choices Congress made when it
codified the Hillmon doctrine as rule 803(3). Part IV analyzes how
the courts have applied this exception to statements in criminal
81. See supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text.
82. The majority in United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1976), rejected
the conclusion that the hearsay dangers of intervening circumstances or alteration of inten-
tion increase when the effectuation of the declarant's stated intention requires the coopera-
tion of another.
The inference from a statement of present intention that the act intended was in
fact performed is nothing more than an inference. Even where no actions by other
parties are necessary in order for the intended act to be performed, a myriad of contin-
gencies could intervene to frustrate the fulfillment of the intention. The fact that the
cooperation of another party is necessary if the intended act is to be performed adds
another important contingency, but the difference is one of degree rather than kind.
The possible unreliability of the inference to be drawn from the present intention is a
matter going to the weight of the evidence which might be argued to the trier of fact,
but it should not be a ground for completely excluding the admittedly relevant
evidence.
Id. at 376 n.14.
83. Either "remedy" would leave only the inference that Walters went to Crooked
Creek.
84. See infra part IV.
85. See infra notes 248-53 and accompanying text.
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cases and examines the various safeguards many courts have re-
quired to ensure that statements of the declarant's then-existing
intention of future conduct that implicate the defendant are
trustworthy.
III. RULE 803(3)
The Federal Rules of Evidence, as enacted by Congress in
1975, are the product of more than ten years of scrutiny by both
Congress and the judiciary.86 The intent behind each rule may be
found among several sources. The Advisory Committee, through
Chief Justice Burger, presented to Congress its final version of the
proposed rules in 1972 with explanatory notes accompanying many
of the rules.87 The House and Senate Judiciary Committees
86. The very idea of codifying the common-law rules of evidence into a single statute
was controversial. A Special Committee on Evidence appointed by Chief Justice Warren in
1961, however, determined that uniform rules of evidence were "advisable and feasible," and
recommended that such rules be "promulgated promptly." S. REP. No. 93-1277, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7051, 7051-52. Chief Justice
Warren appointed the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence in March
1965, and it submitted its first draft of proposed rules to the Judicial Conference in March
1969. 46 F.R.D. 161, 173 (1969). After receiving comments and suggestions on the proposed
rules, the committee submitted a revised draft. See 51 F.R.D. 315, 316 (1971). Finally, pur-
suant to his statutory authority "to govern procedure in the proceedings and to the extent
set forth therein, the United States Court of Appeals, the United States district courts ...
and before United States magistrates," 56 F.R.D. 183 (1972), Chief Justice Burger submit-
ted the Advisory Committee's final draft to Congress in February 1973. S. REP. No. 93-1277,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7051, 7052.
To prevent automatic enforcement by statute of the proposed rules at the end of 180
days, Congress postponed their effectiveness indefinitely. See Act of Mar. 30, 1973, Pub. L.
No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9. In the House the "Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the House
Judiciary Committee ... after extensive consideration in executive session published a
committee print of H.R. 5463, the legislative embodiment of the proposed rules, in June of
1973." S. REP. No. 93-1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
An. NEws 7051, 7052. The Subcommittee's version of the proposed rules was the product of
six days of hearings, a preliminary draft after seventeen "mark-up sessions," and a final
draft after five "markup sessions." H.R. REP. No. 93-650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 4, reprinted
in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7075, 7077-78. The House Judiciary Committee ap-
proved the final draft and included explanatory notes to explain its views. Id., reprinted in
1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 7078.
In full committee the Senate Judiciary Committee considered the House version during
two days of hearings and it amended the proposed rules according to its views as expressed
by explanatory notes. S. REP. No. 93-1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. Naws 7051, 7054.
Finally, a conference committee met twice and resolved the "more significant differ-
ences in the House and Senate versions of the bill," CONF. RaP. No. 93-1597 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 5, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7098, producing the version that
Congress eventually enacted on January 2, 1975.
87. 56 F.R.D. 183 (1972).
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amended that draft several times until a conference committee ap-
proved the final version and Congress enacted it into law." Unfor-
tunately, the Conference Report did not resolve the Advisory Com-
mittee's conflicting statements of the intended scope of rule
803(3).81
Congress enacted rule 803(3) as an exception" to the rule
against hearsay and entitled it "Then existing mental, emotional or
physical condition." This rule codifies the Hillmon doctrine and
reads in pertinent part,91
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the de-
clarant is available as a witness:
(3) .. . A statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, [or]
emotion... (such as intent, plan, motive, [and] design.. .), but not includ-
ing a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed
unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of de-
clarant's will."2
88. See infra notes 103-08 and accompanying text.
89. The Federal Rules of Evidence underwent numerous revisions by the Advisory
Committee to the Judicial Center and both the House and Senate Committees on the Judi-
ciary before the inevitable compromise recommended by the Conference Report. One wit-
ness advised the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice to avoid the predictable confu-
sion the legislative process would create.
To meet this problem we urge the House Judiciary Committee to issue a Report
with the bill adopting the Rules which will contain a comprehensive set of notes, pre-
pared in cooperation with the Advisory Committee. The Judiciary Committee's notes
should bear the endorsement of the Advisory Committee. As the Rules undergo further
refinement in the legislative process, the notes should be appropriately amended to
reflect changes, and the concurrence of the Advisory Committee in the final set of notes
should be sought. If these rules are in fact to clarify evidentiary rulings in the federal
courts and not complicate such rulings with endless debate over the "legislative his-
tory" of particular rules, it is important that there be only one set of notes.
Rules of Evidence (Supplement): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice (For-
merly Designated As Special Subcommittee on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws) of the
House Committee on the Judiciary on Proposed Rules of Evidence, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 280
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Hearings (Supplement)] (statement by Charles R. Halpern).
Because the Senate Committee did not address the modification to the Advisory Com-
mittee's interpretation of rule 803(3) that the House Committee made in its explanatory
note, the Conference Committee apparently failed to notice the conflicting statements of
intent, which fulfilled Mr. Halpern's fears. See United States v. Mangan, 575 F.2d 32, 43
n.12 (2d Cir. 1978); infra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
90. Rule 803(3) actually contains two exceptions. This Note discusses only the excep-
tion that allows hearsay declarations of then-existing state of mind as evidence to prove
subsequent conduct by the declarant. Also excepted from the rule against hearsay by Rule
803(3) are hearsay statements of then-existing physical condition. 4 J. WmNSTmN & M. BEa-
GER, supra note 3, at 803-91 to -94.
91. This quotation does not include the language in rule 803(3) that excepts state-
ments of then-existing physical condition from the rule against hearsay.
92. FED. R. Evw. 803(3) advisory committee note.
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Congress explicitly excluded statements that refer to past con-
duct from this state-of-mind exception. The Advisory Committee
noted that this was "necessary to avoid the virtual destruction of
the hearsay rule which would otherwise result from allowing state
of mind, provable by a hearsay statement, to serve as the basis for
an inference of the happening of the event which produced the
state of mind,"93 and cited the Supreme Court's holding in Shep-
ard v. United States." In that case the Government sought to in-
troduce a statement made by the defendant's wife that "'Dr.
Shepard has poisoned me.' 9 5 Justice Cardozo noted in his opinion
that the Government "used the declarations as proof of an act
committed by some one else, as evidence that she was dying of
poison given by her husband."" Cardozo's opinion set the limits on
the admissibility of state-of-mind evidence under the Hillmon doc-
trine exception to the rule against hearsay. Recognizing that
Hillmon had evoked substantial criticism from courts and com-
mentators, Cardozo feared that the rule against hearsay would dis-
appear if courts failed to distinguish between declarations of intent
"casting light upon the future" and declarations of memory "point-
ing backwards to the past."" Ruling that the statement was inad-
missible, Cardozo noted,
The testimony now questioned faced backward and not forward. This at
least it did in its most obvious implications. What is even more important, it
spoke to a past act, and more than that, to an act by some one not the
speaker. Other tendency, if it had any, was a filament too fine to be disentan-
gled by a jury.9S
93. Id.
94. 290 U.S. 96 (1933).
95. Id. at 98.
96. Id. at 104. In an oft-quoted passage, Justice Cardozo stated,
This fact, if fact it was, the Government was free to prove, but not by hearsay declara-
tions. It will not do to say that the jury might accept the declarations for any light that
they cast upon the existence of a vital urge, and reject them to the extent that they
charged the death to someone else. Discrimination so subtle is a feat beyond the com-
pass of ordinary minds. The reverberating clang of those accusatory words would
drown out all weaker sounds. It is for weaker minds, and not for psychoanalysts, that
our rules of evidence are framed. They have their source very often in considerations of
administrative convenience, of practical expediency, and not in rules of logic. When the
risk of confusion is so great as to upset the balance of advantage, the evidence goes out.
Id.
The risk of prejudice is also significant when the future conduct to which these state-
ments by the declarant point requires the cooperation of a third party who is the defendant
charged with the declarant's murder. See infra notes 243-53 and accompanying text.
97. Cardozo characterized Hillmon as the "high water line beyond which courts have
been unwilling to go." 290 U.S. at 105-06.
98. Id.
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Although this passage is dictum,"9 Shepard defined the scope
of the Hillmon doctrine that subsequent courts have followed and
that Congress eventually codified in rule 803(3)."00 Cardozo feared
that the exclusionary hearsay rule would disappear if courts per-
mitted state-of-mind evidence to prove past acts because logically
statements that refer to past acts through observation would be
admissible as well.101 The only common-law exception to the Shep-
ard limitation that Congress adopted in rule 803(3) allows state-
ments that refer to past conduct when the validity of the deceased
declarant's will is at issue. Unique need justifies this exception
since only evidence of the decedent's state of mind can prove his
intention and, because the decedent is unavailable, the only source
of this evidence is his hearsay declarations.102 Congress chose not
to extend this principle to declarations by unavailable declarants
in other situations.
Congress clearly intended to limit the state-of-mind exception
to statements pointing toward future conduct. The extent to which
this exception includes such statements, however, is not so easily
determined. The Advisory Committee stated, "The rule of Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon . . . , allowing evidence of intention as
tending to prove the doing of the act intended, is, of course, left
undisturbed"103 by rule 803(3). Accordingly, if one accepts the Ad-
visory Committee's interpretation, hearsay statements of intent
that implicate a third party's conduct are admissible. The House
Committee on the Judiciary, on the other hand, stated that "the
Committee intends that the Rule be construed to limit the doc-
trine of Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon. . . , so as to render state-
ments of intent by a declarant admissible only to prove his future
99. See 4 J. WEINSTRIN & M. BERGER, supra note 3, at 803-112 to -115. This treatise
states that "although the dictum in. . . [Shepard] certainly supports [the rule]. . . , the
facts support a much narrower holding." Id. at 803-112. This characterization of that part of
Shepard which addressed the state of mind exception as dictum is based upon the introduc-
tion of Mrs. Shepard's statements at trial under the dying declaration exception. Id. The
opinion's status as dictum, however, has not affected its impact upon the application of the
Hillmon doctrine.
100. Id. at 803-115.
101. See, e.g., Hinton, supra note 39, at 421-23; Maguire, supra note 39, at 721-23; see
also supra note 65.
102. FED. R. Evm. 803(3). The Advisory Committee stated, "The carving out, from the
exclusion [of statements that refer to past conduct] ... . of declarations relating to the
execution, revocation, identification, or terms of declarant's will represents an ad hoc judg-
ment which finds ample reinforcement in the decisions, resting on practical grounds of ne-
cessity and expediency rather than logic." 51 F.R.D. 315, 424 (1971).
103. See 51 F.R.D. 315, 424 (1971).
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conduct, not the future conduct of another person.' 104 The House
Subcommittee heard testimony proposing this limitation and the
full Committee apparently adopted the recommendations in its ex-
planatory note.10 5 The statements of the Advisory Committee and
104. Id.
105. For the legislative history of the Federal Rules of Evidence, see supra note 86.
The House Subcommittee drafted two versions of the rules; the versions neither altered the
Advisory Committee's proposed rule 803(3) nor contained explanatory notes for the pro-
posed rules. See Hearings (Supplement), supra note 89, at 145, 357. In six days of hearings
the House Subcommittee did not discuss the Hillmon doctrine as codified by the proposed
rule 803(3). See Rules of Evidence: Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Reform of
Federal Criminal Laws of the House Committee on the Judiciary on Proposed Rules of
Evidence, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1973). After publication of the first version, the Subcom-
mittee solicited comments and suggestions on the proposed rules. Hearings (Supplement),
supra note 89, at iii.
Three comments addressed proposed rule 803(3). First, the American College of Trial
Lawyers recommended passage of the exception as drafted. Id. at 74. Second, the President
of the Connecticut Bar Association recommended that the Subcommittee recast rules
803(1), (2), and (3) as rule 804 exceptions, which require the unavailability of the declarant
as a prerequisite to admissibility. He stated,
They are serious exceptions to the hearsay rule and subject to many frailties. The ap-
proach suggested by the Rule would appear to be fraught with danger as to possible
prejudice even though the witness can be called by the opposing party for purposes of
cross-examination. The burden should be upon the proposing party to bring the wit-
ness to court and to have him testify live and to give testimony which is clearly
admissible.
Id. at 274 (statement of Harry S. Gaucher, Jr.). Last, the Chairman of the Study Committee
on the Federal Rules of Evidence of the District of Columbia Bar Association approved the
text of rule 803(3) but expressed concern for the scope of its application. Quoting the Advi-
sory Committee's statement of intention to leave the Hillmon doctrine undisturbed, he
stated,
As phrased, the [Advisory Committee's] sentence may merely refer to the well accepted
use of prior intention (as evidenced by a declaration or otherwise) as circumstantial
evidence tending to show that the declarant probably carried out his intention. The
[Hillmon] decision, however, also approved the use of the intention of A of going on a
trip with B as evidence of what B later did. This gets before the trier the intention of
someone other than the declarant. But the declarant, though he knows his own state of
mind, can only know the intention of B through B's statements to A or through A's
inference from circumstances or both. This hearsay exception is said to be reliable only
as to A's statements of his own then existing intentions since A is conscious of his own
inner state of mind and there are no memory problems. The rationale does not extend
to A's statements of B's inner purposes, however, but only to B's declarations of his
own existing intention. As Justice Traynor pointed out in his dissent in People v. Al-
calde, 24 Cal. 2d 177, 148 P.2d 627 (1944), the declarations of the deceased that she
was going out with the defendant later that night cannot be admitted for the purpose
of proving the defendant's probable conduct that night "without setting aside the rule
against hearsay." [Id. at 632; see infra notes 113-26 and accompanying text]. The Com-
mittee therefore recommends either that the Note be changed to expressly reflect the
applicability of Rule 803(3) only to declarations of intention of A to prove A's probable
future conduct or at least that the sentence approving Hillmon be deleted. The latter
action would at least avoid foreclosing the raising of the above problem in future cases.
Hearings (Supplement), supra note 89, at 288 (statement of Joseph S. McCarthy).
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the House Committee represent starkly contrasting viewpoints on
the proper application of the Hillmon doctrine. Neither the Senate
Judiciary Committee nor the subsequent Conference Committee
addressed this conflict, and Congress retained both explanatory
notes as statements of the legislative intent of rule 803(3). ' " Two
possible reasons for this oversight are that no one altered the first
version of rule 803(3) as drafted by the Advisory Committee,07
and the exception itself provoked little controversy.10 8 Neverthe-
less, the courts face two interpretations of the same rule in deter-
mining the proper limits of the Hillmon doctrine under rule
803(3).109
Since the codification of the Hilimon doctrine in rule 803(3),
several courts have expressed confusion over the scope of the ex-
ception in light of the conflicting statements of legislative intent.
In one opinion Judge Friendly noted that certain hearsay state-
ments arguably were admissible under rule 803(3), but "[b]ecause
of confusion generated by the Federal Rules of Evidence," he pre-
ferred to admit the statements under another exception.110 Judge
Friendly stated,
The Senate Committee was silent and the Conference Report consequently
did not comment. Are the Senate and the President or, for that matter, the
members of the House who were not on the Committee to be considered to
have adopted the text of the Rule, as glossed by the Advisory Committee's
Note that Rule 803(3) enacted Hillmon, or the House Committee's "construc-
tion" which, in effect, seriously restricts Hillmon?111
The Supreme Court has not answered this question but most
courts have applied rule 803(3) in the common-law tradition.
This conflict focuses on the propriety of allowing into evidence
hearsay statements by the declarant that tend to prove circum-
stantially that he acted in conformity with his stated intention
when that action required the cooperation of a third party. Section
106. See supra note 35.
107. See supra note 105.
108. See id.
109. Weinstein and Berger in their treatise on the Federal Rules of Evidence inexpli-
cably commented that Congress "expressed a legislative intent in the House Judiciary Com-
mittee's report with respect to Rules 803(3).... [Tihe comments of the House Judiciary
Committee to 803(3) . .. generally reflect the draftsman's intentions and will not signifi-
cantly affect the result reached without this comment." 4 J. WmNSTMN & M. BERGER, supra
note 3, at 803-07 to -08.
110. United States v. Mangan, 575 F.2d 32,43 n.12 (2d Cir. 1978). The court admitted
the challenged hearsay statements under the co-conspirator exception of FD. R. Evm.
801(d)(2)(E).
111. United States v. Mangan, 575 F.2d 32, 43 n.12 (2d Cir. 1978).
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4 of part II examined the inherent hearsay dangers that stem from
the admission of such statements.112 Other dangers arise when the
hearsay statement implicates the conduct of a third party who is
the defendant in a criminal trial. The next part analyzes the vari-
ous policy rationales employed to resolve this issue and examines
how state and federal courts have applied this exception in crimi-
nal trials.
IV. RuLE 803(3) AND THE Hilimon DocTRINE APPLIED
Rule 803(3) has its greatest impact on the outcome of a crimi-
nal trial when the hearsay statement implicates a third party who
is the defendant charged with the murder of the declarant, and
whose cooperation was imperative to the occurrence of the declar-
ant's stated intention. In People v. Alcalde1 3 the California court
confronted this situation. The declarant in Alcalde told her friend
"that she was going to dinner that night with 'Frank.' ""1" That
night the declarant was murdered, and the Government charged
Frank, the third party implicated by the deceased declarant's
statement, with her murder.11 5 A majority of the California Su-
preme Court upheld the trial court's admission of the incriminat-
ing statement under the common-law Hillmon doctrine.1 6 The
court examined the statement for any indicia of reliability to jus-
tify its admission.
Elements essential to admissibility are that the declaration must tend to
prove the declarant's intention at the time it was made; it must have been
made under circumstances which naturally give verity to the utterance; it
must be relevant to an issue in the case.... Unquestionably, the deceased's
statement of her intent and the logical inference to be drawn therefrom,
namely, that she was with the defendant that night, were relevant to the is-
sue of the guilt of the defendant. But the declaration was not the only fact
from which an inference could be drawn that the deceased was with the de-
fendant that night. Other facts were in evidence from which the inference
could reasonably be drawn. The cumulation of facts corroborative of the guilt
of the defendant was sufficient to indicate that the trial court did not err in
112. See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
113. 24 Cal. 2d 177, 148 P.2d 627 (1944).
114. Id. at 181, 148 P.2d at 628.
115. Id. at 179, 148 P.2d at 628.
116. Id. at 185-88, 148 P.2d at 630-32. Citing Hillmon, the court stated,
From the declared intent to do a particular thing an inference that the thing was
done may fairly be drawn. Such declarations have been deemed admissible where they
possessed a high degree of trustworthiness. Where they are relevant to an issue in the
case and the declarant is dead or otherwise unavailable the necessity for their admis-
sion has been recognized.
Id. at 185-86, 148 P.2d at 631.
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admitting the declaration."17
The trial court in Alcalde "took the precaution to state in the
presence of the jury that the evidence was admitted for the limited
purpose of showing the decedent's intention. '" ' s The majority's
analysis, however, ignores the unique dangers of intervening cir-
cumstances and alteration of intention that accompany these types
of statements.11 The court approved the trial court's limiting in-
struction confining the impact of the statement to the deceased de-
clarant's intentions but recognized that "the logical inference to be
drawn therefrom. . .[was] that she was with the defendant that
night.11 20 Justice Traynor noted in dissent that the jury reasonably
could not have confined the impact of the statement because the
deceased's declaration "that she was going out with Frank is also a
declaration that he was going out with her, and it could not be
admitted for the limited purpose of showing that she went out
with him at the time in question without necessarily showing that
he went out with her."' 21
Justice Traynor recognized that the prosecution's true purpose
in offering the statements was to prove circumstantially that the
defendant intended to go out, and did go out with the deceased
declarant on the night of her murder, which made it more probable
than not that the defendant killed her.122 Thus, the declarant's
statement of intent also served to prove the defendant's intent.
Moreover, the jury could not have accepted that the declarant ac-
tually possessed the then-existing state of mind to go out with
Frank unless it also accepted that the declarant had some reason
to believe that Frank intended to go out with her. That is, Frank's
past acts must have caused the declarant to believe he intended to
go out with her on the night of the murder. Statements that point
toward past conduct, however, are inadmissible under both com-
mon law and rule 803(3)123 because of the fear that such an excep-
tion would erode the rule against hearsay.12 4 Arguably, every state-
ment of the declarant's intended conduct that requires the
cooperation of a third party implicitly refers to some past act of
117. Id. at 187-88, 148 P.2d at 632.
118. Id. at 185, 148 P.2d at 630.
119. See supra notes 73-82 and accompanying text.
120. 24 Cal. 2d at 188, 148 P.2d at 632.
121. Id. at 189, 148 P.2d at 633 (Traynor, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 189-90, 148 P.2d at 632.
123. See supra notes 93-102 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 62-72 and accompanying text.
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the third party upon which the declarant based his belief. Because
statements such as the one in Alcalde do not refer expressly to
these past actions, a majority of the courts have admitted them.1 2 5
The majority and dissenting opinions in Alcalde represent the
conflict over the proper limits of the Hillmon doctrine. This con-
flict survived the codification of the Hilmon doctrine in rule
803(3) in the form of inconsistent statements of legislative intent.
Most courts have used the common-law Hillmon doctrine or rule
803(3) to allow into evidence the deceased declarant's hearsay
statements that implicate the defendant in the declarant's murder
trial.128 Ample authority justifies this application of the Hillmon
doctrine. First, the Hillmon Court ruled that such statements
which implicate the conduct of third parties are admissible as an
exception to the rule against hearsay."' Although Hilmon was a
civil case, the Court cited several criminal cases to support its
holding. 28 Second, the Advisory Committee noted that it intended
125. In most cases, the courts have not recognized that past acts that provided reason
for the declarant's belief are the basis of all statements of future intention. Because the past
acts are not expressed in these statements, arguably they are not before the jury and there-
fore, their admission does not risk the hearsay dangers of faulty perception and erroneous
memory.
126. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 571 F.2d 76, 82 n.3 (2d Cir. 1978) (Coffrin, J.)
(dictum); United States v. Stanchich, 550 F.2d 1294, 1297-98 n.1 (2d Cir. 1977) (Friendly,
J.) (court declined to rule on statements admitted under the Hillmon exception, but indi-
cated that with corroborative evidence these statements would be admissible) (cited as a
majority holding in United States v. Moore, 571 F.2d 76, 82 n.3 (2d Cir. 1978)); United
States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353, 374-80 (9th Cir. 1976) (Renfrew, J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1099 (1977); United States v. Calvert, 523 F.2d 895, 910 (8th Cir. 1975) (Heaney, J.) cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 911 (1976) (court admitted deceased declarant's statement "he intended to
speak to the defendant about cancelling the insurance and getting out of the partnership");
Hayes v. State, 395 So. 2d 127, 142-44 (Ala. Crim. App. 1980) (applying state common-law
res gestae exception); State v. Abernathy, 265 Ark. 218, 219-22, 577 S.W.2d 591, 592-94
(1979) (applying state's version of rule 803(3)); State v. Cugliata, 372 A.2d 1019, 1027 (Me.)
("Maine law has recognized a 'present mental state' exception to the hearsay rule as appli-
cable in criminal prosecutions, along the lines discussed by the Supreme Court . . . in
Hillmon and as acknowledged, and continued in effect, by Rule 803(3) M.R., Evid"), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 856 (1977); State v. Sharbono, 175 Mont. 373, 385-86, 563 P.2d 61, 68
(1977) (statement of intent to spend weekend with defendant admissible under state com-
mon law); State v. Thornton, 38 N.J. 380, 389-90, 185 A.2d 9, 14-15 (1962) (statement of
intent by deceased declarant "a few hours before she was shot, of her intention to visit her
husband" admissible under state common law), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 816 (1963); State v.
Vestal, 278 N.C. 561, 581-90, 180 S.E.2d 755, 768-73 (1971) (statement of intent to travel
with defendant admissible under state common law), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973);
Commonwealth v. Lowenberg, 481 Pa. 244, 253-55, 392 A.2d 1274, 1278-79 (1978) (statement
"offered to establish the intention of the deceased to see the appellant and confront him
concerning a financial matter she considered serious" admissible under state common law).
127. See supra notes 38-59 and accompanying text.
128. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285, 297 (1892).
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rule 803(3) to leave the Hillmon doctrine undisturbed. 1 9 Third,
the safeguards of limiting instructions and the allocation of the
burden of proof to the government in a criminal trial arguably pro-
vide adequate protection for the defendant. 13  Last, these courts
have applied the exception in most cases when the surrounding cir-
cumstances bolster the reliability of the Hillmon statements." 1
No federal court has expressly refused to apply the common-
law Hillmon doctrine or the "undisturbed" version of rule 803(3).
In United States v. Pheaster32 the facts of the case and the prof-
fered statements closely parallelled those in People v. Alcalde.1 33
Two witnesses at trial in Pheaster testified that the declarant
stated his intention to meet the defendant in a parking lot in order
to receive a free pound of marijuana.1 3 4 These statements impli-
cated the defendant, who was on trial with others for kidnapping
the deceased declarant.13 5 The defendant challenged the admission
of this hearsay on the ground that the jury could not reasonably
have complied with the trial court's limiting instruction that it
consider the statement only as proof of the declarant's conduct.1 36
Specifically, the defendant claimed that "there was no need to
name the person with whom [the declarant] intended to meet, and
that the limiting instruction was insufficient to overcome the
prejudice to which he was exposed by the testimony."1 3 7
The court upheld admission of the statements under the
Hillmon doctrine.13 8 Citing Hillmon,139 California case law, and the
California Evidence Code140 to support its holding, the court also
129. See supra notes 103-08 and accompanying text.
130. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, at 699-701.
131. These circumstances include (1) the relevance of the statement to a material is-
sue in the case; (2) the existence of other corroborative facts tending to prove that the de-
clarant indeed carried out his stated intention; and (3) other facts in the case that allay the
traditional fears of potential insincerity and ambiguity inherent in all hearsay.
132. 544 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1976) (Renfrew, J.).
133. See supra notes 113-25 and accompanying text.
134. 544 F.2d at 375.
135. Id. at 358-59.
136. Id. at 375.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 374-80. The court noted that "the standard. . . of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. . . governed at. . . the trial below." Id. at 375-76. Thus, "the District
Court was required to decide issues concerning the 'admissibility of evidence' according to
'the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United
States in light of reason and experience.'" Id. at 376.
139. See supra notes 38-59 and accompanying text.
140. Section 1250 of the state code codified the Hillmon doctrine and the comments to
that section cited Alcalde, which the Pheaster court cited as precedent for rejecting the
19821
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examined the recently enacted Federal Rules of Evidence "for any
light they might shed on the status of the common law at the time
of trial."' The court noted that while the Advisory Committee
comments to rule 803(3) suggest that the rule fully incorporates
the common-law Hillmon doctrine, the House Committee notes in-
dicate that the rule limits the Hillmon doctrine to disallow state-
ments similar to those in Pheaster.142 Although the Pheaster court
recognized the danger of intervening circumstances when the ac-
complishment of the declarant's stated intent requires the coopera-
tion of a third party,143 the court refused to order exclusion of the
statements, stating,
[T]he difference is one of degree rather than kind. The possible unreliability
of the inference to be drawn from the present intention is a matter going to
the weight of the evidence which might be argued to the trier of fact, but it
should not be a ground for completely excluding the admittedly relevant
evidence. 4 "
Implicit in the Pheaster court's holding is the ruling that po-
tential prejudice to the defendant is not a consideration in the
analysis of Hillmon evidence. The court noted that the statements
implicating the defendant might have prejudiced him if the trial
court had admitted them solely to rebut the "issue created by the
defense... that [the declarant] had not been kidnapped but had
disappeared voluntarily as part of a simulated kidnapping
designed to extort money from his wealthy father from whom he
was already estranged. 1 45 The court intimated that such a situa-
tion might have warranted the excision of any reference to the de-
fendant.1 41 Because the statements fell within the Hillmon doc-
trine, however, their admission into evidence did not prejudice the
defendant. 47
defendant's challenge. 544 F.2d at 379. See supra notes 113-26 for a discussion of Alcalde.
141. 544 F.2d at 379.
142. Id. at 379-80.
143. Id. at 376 n.14.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 375.
146. Id. at 375 n.12. Quoting Shepard, the court stated, "Were this the only theory
under which the testimony could come in, we would tend to agree with [the defendant]. In
such a context, the potential prejudice would far outweigh the potential relevance of the
testimony, and a limiting instruction would not sufficiently safeguard the defendant." Id.
147. Id. at 375. The court acknowledged "the theoretical awkwardness associated with
the application of the Hillmon doctrine to facts such as those now before us, [but] the au-
thority in favor of such an application is impressive, beginning with the seminal Hillmon
decision itself." Id. at 377. The court cited this precedent in rejecting the defendant's argu-
ment that the jury could not comply with the trial court's limiting instruction to use the
statements only "for the limited purpose of showing the 'state of mind of [the declarant],'
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Although Judge Ely concurred in this part of the Pheaster
holding, 14s he conceded that the statements' admission into evi-
dence was not reversible error in light of the Hillmon doctrine.1 49
Citing Shepard'50 and the Traynor dissent in Alcalde, 51 Ely as-
serted that courts should limit the Hillmon doctrine according to
the guidelines suggested by the House Judiciary Committee in its
explanatory note to rule 803(3).l s2 He recognized the prejudice suf-
fered by the defendant when the trial court admitted the declar-
ant's hearsay statements implicating him. Ely acknowledged that
because the declaration "was the strongest evidence linking [the
defendant] to the conspiracy," the risk was substantial that the
jury would rely on it to prove both the acts of the declarant and
the acts of the defendant, notwithstanding limiting instructions.5ss
In United States v. Moore1 " the burden of proof requirement
mitigated any potential prejudice that the admitted hearsay state-
ments may have caused the defendant. In Moore the Government
charged the defendants with interstate transportation of a kidnap
victim.15 5 The trial court admitted into evidence an out-of-court
declaration by one of the alleged conspirators that "they would
probably take [the victim] Huggins 'out of the states where he
would never be found.'. . . However, he did not say to whom the
word 'they' referred. 15'  The Second Circuit did not rule on the
admissibility of the statement.157 The appellate court stated that
even if the statement were admissible it was insufficient by itself
.. . and not for 'the truth or falsity of what [he] said.'" Id. at 374-75.
148. Id. at 385.
149. Id. Judge Ely stated, "I am obligated by the almost century-old precedent of...
Hillmon. . . to concur in the majority's decision that the trial court did not commit revers-
ible error in admitting" the challenged statements. "Nevertheless, while my Brother Ren-
frew is doubtless correct that a majority of courts have adhered to the Hillmon doctrine, it
is also true that the holding has been subjected to severe criticism by some of our Nation's
most distinguished judicial scholars." Id. (citations and footnote omitted).
150. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 113.21 and accompanying text.
152. 544 F.2d at 385. Ely concluded,
The fact that the members of the House Judiciary Committee specifically noted their
intent to limit the Hilmon doctrine in Rule 803(3) of the new Federal Rules of Evi-
dence indicates that the sound criticisms voiced by those two eminent members of the
judiciary, as well as other legal scholars, are now widely believed to be valid.
Id. (footnote omitted). See supra part III.
153. 544 F.2d at 385.
154. 571 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1978).
155. Id. at 78.
156. Id. at 79 (citations omitted).
157. Id. at 82.
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"to prove that any actual interstate transportation of [the victim]
ever occurred." 158 The court indicated that if the Government had
presented "additional, more concrete evidence of interstate or for-
eign transportation, [the defendant's] statement of intent . ..
might have been more probative of the fact that the intent was
actually carried out."159 In a footnote the court indicated that had
the Government proffered such corroborative evidence at trial, it
would have upheld the trial court's admission of the statement of
intent.160 Although the appellate court recognized the House Judi-
ciary Committee's limitation on rule 803(3), it nevertheless agreed
with the Government that the Advisory Committee's Note left the
Hillmon doctrine "undisturbed," and that "courts have held that
Hillmon declarations of intent are admissible as evidence of ac-
tions of the declarant and others."' 161
Most state courts apply the traditional common-law approach
or their own state's version of rule 803(3) to Hillmon statements.
For example, in State v. Cugliatal 2 the Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine rejected the defendant's contention that the jury was inca-
pable of complying with the limiting instruction of the trial
judge."8 ' In Cugliata the prosecution offered into evidence a state-
ment by the deceased declarant that he was "planning to buy 10
pounds of hashish at midnight, August 14," and "that two other
people, one of whom was named 'Frank'.. , were to accompany
[him]."'" The prosecution charged Frank with the murder of the
declarant, which "occurred sometime between 11:00 p.m. August
14 and 3:00 a.m. August 15."1' 65 The trial court admitted the state-
ment and gave the following limiting instruction to the jury when
the witness recounted the deceased declarant's statement and dur-
ing the final charge to the jury:
"[T]he only thing... [the statement] will establish for you would be that
there existed, if in fact you find that it does establish that, an intention in the
mind of the declarant to make a trip, and also as bearing upon whether or
not in fact he did make such a trip. But for no . . .other purpose will you
receive this testimony or give it any application."166
158. Id. at 82 (emphasis in original).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 82 n.3.
161. Id.
162. 372 A.2d 1019 (Me.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 856 (1977).
163. Id. at 1029.
164. Id. at 1026.
165. Id. at 1022. Frank was one of two defendants charged with murder.
166. Id. at 1026.
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Citing Hillmon and the exception "preserved by the Maine Rules
of Evidence as Rule 803(3), ''1e7 the court noted that the need for
the evidence," "added indicia of reliability," 6  and "abundant
corroboration that [the declarant's] plan was real and, in fact, car-
ried out"17 0 compelled admission of the statement. The court noted
that the holding in Hillmon was intended to except from the rule
against hearsay "so much of the declarant's plan to take future ac-
tion as included the involvement of other persons in the plan. 1 7 1
The Cugliata court concluded that "[tihe law did not require the
limitations imposed by the [trial judge]" 72 and that "any harm re-
sulting to the defendants because the jury might be unable to com-
ply with the formal instruction would not be a legally impermissi-
ble form of prejudice."'' 78
The New York Supreme Court in dictum limited the applica-
tion of the common-law Hillmon doctrine to the single inference
that the declarant carried out his stated intention to meet the
third party implicated in the statement.'7 4 At trial in People v.
Lauro 7 a Government witness planned to testify about "the in-
tention of the deceased to present to her husband, a few days
before her death, a financial offer in the nature of an ultimatum at
a time when marital relations between them were strained"'7' in
order to prove that the defendant had an opportunity and a motive
to murder his wife. 77 Because no one witnessed the killing, the
Government's evidence against the defendant was entirely circum-
stantial. 78 The Lauro court recognized that the
167. Id. at 1027. The Maine Rules of Evidence were not in effect during the trial. Id.
at 1027 n.3. The court stated that rule 803(3) of the Maine Rules of Evidence "acknowl-
edged" and "continued in effect" the common-law application of the Hilimon doctrine by
the Maine courts in criminal prosecutions. Id. at 1027.
168. Id. at 1028. "[Llike the communications in Hillmon ... [the declarant's] state-
ments concerned future travel plans. [The declarant's] unavailability as a witness also paral-
lels [that case and] accentuates the necessity for admission of the hearsay there recognized."
Id.
169. Id. "[S]ome of the elements" of the coconspirator and declaration against penal
interest exceptions convinced the court that the statement was reliable. Id.
170. Id. Other circumstantial evidence tended to place the deceased declarant and de-
fendant together on the night of the murder. Id.
171. Id. at 1029.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See People v. Lauro, 91 Misc. 2d 706, 710, 398 N.Y.S.2d 503, 505 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 707, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 503 (emphasis in original).
177. Id., 398 N.Y.S.2d at 504.
178. Id. at 708, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 504.
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prosecution intended for the jury [to] draw the following series of inferences:
(1) that [the declarant] did perform the act intended, i.e., confront the de-
fendant with her "ultimatum" financial offer; (2) that [defendant] reacted
adversely to such a proposal;. . . (3) [that this reaction] provided the defen-
dant with a motive to kill; and (4) ultimately led him to actually kill [the
declarant] with a shotgun.1 7 9
The court stated that these inferences went beyond the scope of
Pheaster80 and Alcalde,1'8 in which the victim's statements of in-
tent to meet the defendant provided "some proof that they were in
fact together on the night of the crime, from which the jury might
infer guilt.' 8" The court also noted that in both Pheaster and Al-
calde other direct evidence corroborated the assertion that the de-
clarant and defendant actually met on the day of the murder. 83
Two state courts have limited application of the Hillmon doc-
trine. They recognized the potential prejudice to the defendant
risked by the admission of these hearsay statements and the fail-
ure of limiting instructions to the jury to restrict their impact.'84 In
179. Id. at 710, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 505 (emphasis in original).
180. See supra notes 133-54 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 113-22 and accompanying text.
182. 91 Misc. 2d at 710, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 505.
183. Id. at 710 n.4, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 505 n.4.
184. In the federal courts only dissenting opinions have proposed to limit application
of the Hillmon doctrine. See, e.g:, United States v. Jenkins, 579 F.2d 840, 844-45 (4th Cir.)
(Widener, J., dissenting) (contended that majority accepted the House limitation in rule
803(3) but its application was "erroneous"), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 967 (1978); United States
v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353, 384 (9th Cir. 1976) (Ely, J., dissenting) (recognizes majority rule
but notes agreement with Shepard, the Alcalde dissent, and the House Judiciary Commit-
tee limitation), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1099 (1977).
Although the Jenkins court apparently accepted the House Judiciary Committee's limi-
tation, which would place this court in the minority, in effect it applied the common-law
Hillmon exception and the Advisory Committee's interpretation of rule 803(3) to the hear-
say statement. See 579 F.2d at 843. The Government charged the defendant in Jenkins with
lying before a grand jury. Observers had seen the defendant driving Johnson, with whom he
lived, to the home of a heroin dealer. He dropped Johnson off, waited, and then drove her
back to their home. He gave the grand jury conflicting answers to questions concerning his
knowledge of a drug transaction between Johnson and an accomplice that allegedly occurred
while he waited for Johnson. Id. at 341-42. A police wiretap of Johnson's phone produced
the only evidence of defendant's intent-a statement in which Johnson told her accomplice
"I'm on my way." Id. at 842. The court upheld the admissibility of this statement under rule
803(3) "both to show [Johnson's] intent and to promote an inference that she actually effec-
tuated her intent and set out for" her accomplice's home. Id. at 842-43. Citing Hillmon, the
court held that the defendant's challenge under the House Judiciary Committee's limitation
of rule 803(3) was "misplaced."
Instantly, Johnson's salutation to [her accomplice], "I'm on my way," (or even a
statment that she would come over with [the defendant]) would be inadmissible under
the Congress's limitation if offered solely to prove that [the defendant] did accompany
Johnson. However, the purpose of the proffer here was not to show that [the defen-
dant] drove to the [accomplice's] residence-substantial independent evidence was in-
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Clark v. United States185 the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals considered the admissibility of a statement by the deceased
declarant that "while she expected to attend classes as usual, be-
cause of her fear of [the defendant], she was uncertain as to
whether she would meet him before class." 186 The Government
sought to admit the statement under the Hillmon doctrine not as
circumstantial evidence tending to prove that the declarant in-
tended to meet with the defendant, but as circumstantial evidence
of the defendant's intent to meet with the declarant. Although one
question at trial was "whether [the defendant] was present at the
scene of the crime on the day it was committed,1 8 7 the court ruled
that since neither the location of the murder nor the identification
of the declarant as the deceased was in dispute,18  declarant's state
of mind was not relevant to "a material issue in the case,"119 and
troduced on that point-but rather solely to show why [the defendant] left home in
the middle of the night, drove across town, and let Johnson out in the 1200 block of
North Ellwood Avenue.
Id. at 843 (emphasis added). The court, notwithstanding its apparent acceptance of the mi-
nority view limiting the Hillmon doctrine, justified admission of this statement because its
purpose was "only to show why [the defendant] behaved as he did. [It] was not to show his
conduct on the night in question." Id. at 844 (emphasis in original). The court viewed the
statement as relevant since Johnson's "state of mind was material, given the circumstances
of this case." Id.
Commentators have criticized this holding: "The majority's conclusion . . . that John-
son's state of mind is material seems erroneous since the issue is whether the defendant lied,
not whether Johnson lied." 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 3, at 803-103 n.1. Even
if this statement arguably were relevant, the dissent exposed the flawed analysis of the ma-
jority in Jenkins.
I think the majority's application of Rule 803(3) ... is erroneous. As the court
correctly observes, the hearsay exception for statements of a declarant's existing state
of mind is applicable only to admit proof of the declarant's future conduct, not that of
third persons. [quoting the House Judiciary Committee limitation] . . .Thus, if John-
son had stated, "Jenkins [the defendant] is about to drive me over," clearly the state-
ment would be inadmissible to prove that [the defendant] did so. The majority con-
cedes this much, yet it is willing to accept the introduction of a hearsay statement, the
only relevance of which is to prove the same thing as the just-quoted statement, only to
do so inferentially, rather than directly. The point is that the tapes were not intro-
duced merely to prove that Beatrice Johnson went to visit [her accomplice] . . . .They
were introduced to prove by inference something that they would be inadmissible to
prove directly, that Johnson asked [the defendant] for a ride to [the accomplice's]
house, that [the defendant] knowingly complied with that request, and therefore that
[the defendant] lied to the grand jury.
579 F.2d at 845.
185. 412 A.2d 21 (D.C. 1980) (Newman, J.).
186. Id. at 29.
187. Id. at 28-29.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 30.
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therefore, the statement was inadmissible. The court stated,
We accept the approach taken in the House Report not only because it
admits statements of intention consistent with the standards applied to the
admission of other state-of-mind evidence, but also because the declarant's
statements, if reliable at all, are only reliable as to the declarant's own inten-
tion. Needless to say, if the statements not only involve the declarant's inten-
tion but also those of the defendant, and the declarant's intention is not an
issue in dispute, the prejudice to the defendant is compounded. . . .The
logic of Justice Traynor's dissent in People v. Alcalde is as persuasive today
as when it was first written. . . .Clearly, to admit such evidence where the
victim's intentions are irrelevant violates one of the fundamental concepts of
the state-of-mind exception: that the declarant's own state of mind be rele-
vant to a material issue in the case.190
The court in Clark adopted the minority view that statements
of intention implicating third parties are inadmissible. Therefore,
even if the declarant's intention had been a material issue and her
statement expressed her intent to meet the defendant at a certain
time and place, the court would not have admitted the statement
"due to the prejudice to the defendant that results from the depar-
ture from traditional state-of-mind concepts. 191
An Illinois district court in People v. Cole held that the com-
mon-law Hillmon doctrine did not apply to criminal cases.192 Al-
though the court ruled that the admission of the hearsay was
harmless error, it found "no basis for establishing in a criminal
case 'the declaration of mental state' or 'a statement of intention'
as an exception to the hearsay rule in derogation of the defen-
dant's rights of confrontation and cross-examination as assured by
the constitution."9 " A special concurring opinion rejected the ma-
jority's limitation and noted that "such testimony would appear to
be admissible under Rule 803(3) of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence,"1 94 to become effective one month after the Cole decision.
Any limitation of the common-law Hillmon doctrine or rule
803(3) represents the minority view. Most courts confronted with
Hillmon statements, however, have exhibited an acute awareness
of the dangers posed by these statements. One reason for the con-
tinued vitality of this doctrine appears to be that courts are natu-
rally reluctant to overrule or limit a longstanding common-law tra-
dition. Part V suggests a framework for examining Hillmon
statements to determine what dangers they may pose in a criminal
190. Id. at 30 (citation omitted).
191. Id. at 29.
192. 29 Ill. App. 3d 369, 329 N.E.2d 880 (1975).
193. Id. at 374, 329 N.E.2d at 885.
194. Id. at 381, 329 N.E.2d at 890 (concurring opinion).
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trial and to evaluate their admissibility as evidence.
V. ANALYSIS
Statements of future intent admitted into evidence under the
Hilimon doctrine risk four hearsay dangers: ambiguity, insincerity,
frustration of purpose, and alteration of intent. ' 5 Congress chose
to accept these dangers when it codified the common-law exception
in rule 803(3).196 Whether Congress intended this exception to ap-
ply to statements that implicate the conduct of a third party is
unclear from the legislative history because of conflicting state-
ments of legislative intent, 97 but an overwhelming majority of
courts have applied rule 803(3) in the common-law tradition.198
Thus, in most jurisdictions statements of future intent are admissi-
ble as circumstantial evidence that the declarant's intended con-
duct occurred even if performance of that conduct required the
joint action or cooperation of a third party. The use of these state-
ments as evidence particularly risks the dangers of frustration of
purpose and alteration of intention. In part IV this Note examined
the cases in which the prosecution used the Hillmon exception to
admit statements of intent by the deceased declarant that impli-
cated the defendant charged with the declarant's murder. Admis-
sion of statements of future intent that place the defendant and
declarant together at or near the time of declarant's murder en-
dangers the defendant's right to a fair trial if the jury does not
restrict the use of this circumstantial evidence only to proof of the
declarant's probable conduct. Because of the potential prejudice to
the defendant in this situation, the trial court must consider care-
fully the admissibility of each statement on a case by case basis
and avoid perfunctory application of this exception.
A. Past or Future Conduct
The first step a trial court must take is to determine whether a
statement falls within the parameters of the Hilimon doctrine. The
most important limitation on this exception is that it applies only
to statements of intention to engage in future conduct rather than
to statements referring to conduct that occurred in the past. This
195. See supra part II.
196. See supra part III.
197. See supra notes 103-09 and accompanying text.
198. See supra part IV.
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requirement exists both at common law'99 and under rule 803(3),200
but confining the doctrine in this manner is often difficult in prac-
tice. The most obvious example of a statement that falls outside
the scope of the Hilimon doctrine is one that refers only to a past
event, such as the statement: "I returned from Crooked Creek to-
day." 0' 1 Conversely, the doctrine clearly includes a statement of fu-
ture conduct, for example, "I will leave tomorrow for Crooked
Creek. 20 2 Justice Cardozo ruled in Shepard v. United States
20 s
that the first statement falls outside the Hillmon doctrine. The
second statement represents the traditional type of hearsay admis-
sible under this exception: a statement of intention referring to fu-
ture travel plans. Between these two extremes lies a third type of
hearsay statement that often defies characterization based upon
the time period to which it points because it may refer simultane-
ously to past, present, and future events.
Judge Friendly in United States v. Annunziato204 defined the
analysis that many courts have applied to statements referring to
both past and future conduct. In that case the deceased declarant
told his son "'that he had received a call from Mr. Annunziato'
and 'that he had been requested by Mr. Annunziato for some
money on the particular project in question, the Bridgeport Har-
bor Bridge.' ,1205 The declarant's son repeated these statements
with the trial court's permission and then testified that "I asked
him what he intended to do, and he had agreed to send some up to
Connecticut for him. ' 20 6 The issue before the court was the admis-
sibility of the statements because the declarant "accompanied his
statement of future plan with an altogether natural explanation of
the reason, in the very recent past, that had prompted it.12 07 Con-
cluding that this statement was admissible under the common-law
Hillmon doctrine, Judge Friendly stated that "the 'most obvious
implications' of [the declarant's] statement looked forward-he
was going to send money to Bridgeport. ' 20 8 He acknowledged that
199. See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
200. See id.
201. See supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text.
203. 290 U.S. 96 (1933). See supra notes 94-102 and accompanying text.
204. 293 F.2d 373 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 919 (1961).
205. Id. at 376.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 377.
208. Id. Judge Friendly derived this "most obvious implications" test from language in
Shepard. See supra notes 94-102 and accompanying text.
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if the Government had offered only the statement referring to the
phone conversation with the defendant-the past event-then the
Shepard limitation would have required exclusion of the evi-
dence. 20 9 Because the testimony included a statement of intention
to engage in future conduct, however, Judge Friendly ruled that
the entire declaration was admissible.21 He stated,
True, inclusion of a past event motivating the plan adds the hazards of defec-
tive perception and memory to that of prevarication; but this does not de-
mand exclusion or even excision, at least when, as here, the event is recent, is
within the personal knowledge of the declarant and is so integrally included
in the declaration of design as to make it unlikely in the last degree that the
latter would be true and the former false.21
The Annunziato decision extended the Hillmon doctrine be-
yond its intended scope. Weinstein and Berger's treatise on evi-
dence expresses cogently the holding's flaw: "The difficulty with
the conclusion in Annunziato is that the evidence was much more
powerful and probative in looking backwards-to show that the
defendant had requested the payment as a bribe-than in looking
forward. The elephant of the past is pulled in by the tail of the
future." 212 The effect of the Annunziato analysis was to allow high-
ly incriminating statements into evidence under the cloak of the
Hillmon doctrine.1 With his disarming language Judge Friendly
deflected attention from the significant departure that Annunziato
made from the Shepard limitation. "To say that this portion of his
statement is sufficiently trustworthy for the jury to consider with-
out confrontation, but that his reference to the telephone call from
Annunziato which produced the decision to send the money is not,
would truly be swallowing the camel and straining at the gnat."2"
Judge Friendly should not have relied upon the admission of state-
ments referring to past events because they accompanied state-
ments of future intent.1 5 Justice Cardozo rejected the use of state-
209. Id. at 378. Judge Friendly stated, "True also, the statement of the past event
would not be admitted if it stood alone, as the Shepard case holds; but this would not be the
only hearsay exception where the pure metal may carry some alloy along with it." Id.
210. Id. at 376-78.
211. Id. at 378.
212. 4 J. WEINSTmIN & M. BERGER, supra note 3, 18 03(3)[05], at 803-119.
213. At the time of the Annunziato decision in 1961, the exceptions to the rule against
hearsay were still developing, and Judge Friendly could not rely upon the declaration
against penal interest exception. "In the Hilimon and Annunziato cases ... there was a
pressing need for the hearsay testimony." United States v. Mandel, 437 F. Supp. 262, 265
(D. Md. 1977) (mem.) (Taylor, J., by designation).
214. 293 F.2d at 377-78.
215. Judge Friendly distinguished Shepard by stating,
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ments that refer to past conduct because such an exception
threatened to swallow the hearsay rule;2 16 the dangers inherent in
their admission do not diminish because they accompany state-
ments admissible under the Hillmon doctrine. Moreover, Judge
Friendly's extension of the Hillmon doctrine was unnecessary be-
cause he also ruled that the statements were admissible under the
common-law coconspirator exception. 17
When certain circumstances are present to allay the tradi-
tional hearsay fears, a number of courts rely on Annunziato to
skirt the rule against hearsay and justify admission of statements
that refer to past conduct.218 The circumstances that induced
Shepard . . . does not hold that a declaration of design is rendered inadmissible be-
cause it embodies a statement why the design was conceived. In that case there was no
relevant declaration of design; the statement, "Dr. Shepard has poisoned me," was
wholly of past fact and was offered and received as a dying declaration, erroneously as
the Supreme Court held.
Id. at 377.
216. See supra notes 94-102 and accompanying text for an explanation of why such an
exception threatens the exclusionary hearsay rule. See supra note 65 for a discussion of
Seligman.
217. 293 F.2d at 378. "Judge Friendly had an alternative basis for admitting the testi-
mony of the son about what his father told him. The father, although dead and not a defen-
dant, was a co-conspirator, and the statements were made in furtherance of and during the
course of the conspiracy." United States v. Mandel, 437 F. Supp. 262, 266 (D. Md. 1977)
(mem.) (Taylor, J., by designation).
218. See, e.g., State of Thornton, 38 N.J. 380, 185 A.2d 9 (1962). In Thornton the
prosecution presented a "luring" theory to the jury and introduced statements that indi-
cated that the defendant carried out his plan to entice his wife, who was the deceased de-
clarant, to his apartment to kill her. Id. at 393-94, 185 A.2d at 17. The court quoted the
testimony at trial:
'Q. Now you had a conversation with Geraldine Thornton. Is that correct? A. It
is.
Q. What did Geraldine Thornton tell you on the phone? A. She asked me had I
seen her husband.
Q. Don't tell us what you said. She asked you if you had seen her husband? A.
Yes, and she said he had called her all day, had worried her about to death.'
'Q. Did you have a conversation with Mrs. Thornton in which she indicated to
you where she was going?
THE COURT: Answer yes or no. A. Yes.
Q. What did she say about where she was going? A. She didn't tell me where she
was going. She said she thought as he was sick she should go and see about it.
Q. At what time was this? A. That was about 4 o'clock.'
Id. at 388-89, 185 A.2d at 14. The trial court ruled in response to an objection that it would
limit the testimony "to the portion of the conversation dealing with the decedent's intention
to make the visit." Id. at 388, 185 A.2d at 14. At the time the witness testified, however,
defense counsel did not object to the portion of the testimony that referred to the past
event-that the defendant had called the declarant all day. Id. Citing Annunziato, the court
ruled that the trial court had properly admitted the entire testimony.
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Judge Friendly to admit the statements refering to past events
could serve more appropriately as the basis for admission under
the residual exception of rule 803(24) in the current Federal Rules
of Evidence.219 Other exceptions now in effect that allow those
same statements into evidence significantly erode the vitality of
the holding.220 Thus, courts should not cite Annunziato as prece-
dent for allowing statements referring to past events into evidence
under either the common-law Hillmon doctrine as defined by
Shepard or rule 803(3) since both exceptions exclude such state-
ments from evidence.
Justice Traynor in People v. Alcalde21 recognized another
theoretical difficulty with the past/future distinction in Hillmon
statements. In Alcalde the declarant's statement that she intended
to go out with Frank the night of her murder implicitly referred to
a past event that gave her a reason for her belief: Frank must have
told the declarant that he intended to go out with her.2"2 Because
the statement does not expressly refer to the past act, it is easily
distinguishable from the statements admitted in Annunziato. Nev-
ertheless, the implicit reference to a past event arguably presents
the same dangers that compel the exclusion of statements referring
expressly to past events. The reliability of statements of future in-
Many cases are to be found where a statement of the reason which accompanied
the expression of intention to take a described trip or to do a certain act have been
admitted. The reasons qualify for probative value so long as they appear to be inte-
grally and naturally related to the declared purpose, to have a natural association with
it, and to have been uttered as a normal, unsuspicious incident of it.
Id. at 391-92, 185 A.2d at 16. For the "luring" theory to have prevailed, however, the jury
must have accepted those statements of past events. The prosecution clearly intended for
the testimony to have its probative force as evidence of past events rather than of future
intent under the Hillmon doctrine. This use violated the Shepard limitation. Other state
courts have recognized that such statements are inadmissible under the Hillmon doctrine.
See, e.g., People v. Hamilton, 55 Cal. 2d 881, 895, 362 P.2d 473, 481, 13 Cal. Rptr. 649, 657
(1971), ("declarations directly asserting the existence of a mental condition on the part of
the decedent-declarant, and not including a description of the past conduct of a third per-
son that may have caused that mental condition, are and should be admissible"); State v.
Abernathy, 265 Ark. 218, 222, 577 S.W.2d 591, 593 (1979) ("statements. . .about the past,
not statements of an existing state of mind" are inadmissible).
219. For a discussion of the application of the residual exception, see infra notes 253-
54 and accompanying text.
220. "In Annunziato, Judge Friendly noted that the exception for declarations against
interest 'would itself be applicable here but for the rather indefensible limitation that it
does not relate to statements only against penal interest.'" 293 F.2d at 378. Rule 804(b)(3)
repudiates this limitation." 4 J. WEINSTmN & M. BERGER, supra note 3, 1 803(3)[05] n.30, at
803-119.
221. 24 Cal. 2d 177, 148 P.2d 627 (1944); see supra notes 113-26 and accompanying
222. See supra text accompanying note 114.
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tent that do not require the cooperation of a third party, on the
other hand, is not contingent upon a past event. Although the de-
clarant's own mental state depends upon some motivating factor,
he need not have relied upon outside cooperation for its effectua-
tion. The House Committee's interpretation of rule 803(3) would
limit the scope of the exception to this type of statement. Judge
Friendly, however, dismissed the significance of an implicit refer-
ence to a past event in Annunziato,223 and courts both at common
law and under rule 803(3) are in accord. 2 '
B. Relevance: A Material Fact
All courts have agreed that Hillmon statements are relevant
only to prove directly the declarant's then-existing state of mind
and to prove circumstantially that the declarant subsequently car-
ried out his stated intention. Limiting instructions are designed to
confine the impact these statements have upon the jury when the
statements implicate defendant's conduct. Under rule 401 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence,225 evidence that makes the existence of
a material fact more probable than not is "relevant" if it is of con-
sequence to the case.2 26
When the declarant's conduct is a material issue in the case, a
statement of intent to carry out that conduct is necessarily rele-
vant. If the time of the conduct's performance coincides with the
time of the declarant's murder, the statement is a crucial element
to a "larger matrix of circumstantial evidence" 227 that tends to es-
223. Judge Friendly stated,
As Professor Morgan has pointed out .... the famous letter from Walters, oral evi-
dence of which was held admissible in the Hillmon case, was actually a declaration of
Walters' intention not simply to travel to Colorado but to travel with Hillmon, and the
inference the jury would almost certainly draw was that this represented a previous
arrangement between them.
Annunziato, 293 F.2d at 377 (footnote omitted). He noted, however, that "Professor Morgan
may overstate this slightly when he says 'that to draw the inference that Waiters went with
Hillmon required an assumption that he had made an arrangement with Hillmon before
Walters wrote the letter." Id. at 377 n.1. For a discussion of the Hilimon case, see supra
notes 38-60 and accompanying text.
224. See authorities cited supra note 126.
225. FED. R. EvID. 401 states, "'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any ten-
dency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."
226. For a discussion of the role that relevance plays in state-of-mind evidence, see
Rice, supra note 39; Seidelson, supra note 39.
227. 4 J. WEINSTIN & M. BERGER, supra note 3, 803(3)[041, at 803-105 (quoting C.
McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 270, at 574 (1954)).
[Vol. 35:659
1982] HILLMON DOCTRINE
tablish the defendant's guilt.2 2 Statements of intent by the declar-
ant may also be relevant to establish a motive for the declarant's
murder if the jury assumes that the declarant carried out his in-
tended conduct.2 29 The trial court, however, should scrutinize care-
fully whether the Hillmon statement proffered by the prosecution
is relevant to proof of a material fact in the case. For example, in
Clark v. United States30 the court noted that whether the de-
ceased declarant intended to go to the school where her murder
took place was not in dispute: "her body was found there and there
has been no dispute as to the identification of her body."' 11 In
Clark the prosecution sought to introduce the declarant's state-
ment of intent to meet the defendant at the scene of her murder.2 32
The court refused to allow the prosecution to link the defendant
and the deceased declarant through a Hillmon statement, because
proof of the declarant's conduct was not material to the case.2 3
C. Corroboration
Several courts that recognized the peculiar dangers associ-
ated with Hillmon statements justified their admission on the
grounds that other evidence corroborated the inference that the
declarant carried out his intention.2 3 For example, in People v. Al-
228. See, e.g., Hayes v. State, 395 So. 2d 127, 144 (Ala. Crim. App. 1980) ("These
statements ... can be fairly said to be part of the 'res gestae of the act being performed or
immediately contemplated by the declarant, the act of beginning or contemplating the trip
or journey' however short."); People v. Alcalde, 24 Cal. 2d 177, 188, 148 P.2d 627, 632 (1944)
("Unquestionably, the deceased's statement of her intent and the logical inference to be
drawn therefrom, namely, that she was with the defendant that night, were relevant to the
issue of the guilt of the defendant."); State v. Thornton, 38 N.J. 380, 389, 186 A.2d 9, 14
(1962) ("When a person's engagement in a course of conduct or an act (here, the decedent's
visit to defendant's apartment) is relevant to the resolution of a controversy over an occur-
rance which becomes the subject of subsequent litigation (here, the homicide), declarations
of the person of his present intention or plan to do so, are competent, substantive, and
original evidence of his probable engagement in the course of conduct or act.").
229. See, e.g., United States v. Calvert, 523 F.2d 895, 910 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 911 (1976) ("The evidence was admitted for the purpose of showing that it was
likely that [the declarant] had in fact approached the defendant and sought to back out of
the partnership and cancel the insurance; . . . . Whether he had so acted was a material
fact since, if true, it would establish the immediate motivation for the defendant's visit to
Alsop."); State v. Vestal, 278 N.C. 561, 583, 180 S.E.2d 755, 769 (1971) ("The testimony...
as to the destination and purpose of the trip contemplated by the deceased, was relevant to
the questions of motive.").
230. 412 A.2d 21 (D.C. 1980); see supra notes 185-91.
231. 412 A.2d at 28.
232. Id. at 29.
233. Id. at 28-30.
234. See, e.g., United States v. Calvert, 523 F.2d 895, 910 (8th Cir. 1975) (Heaney, J.)
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calde23 5 the deceased declarant told both her roommate and her
brother-in-law that she was going out with Frank-the defen-
dant-that night.3 6 Several witnesses testified that they saw the
declarant with the defendant on the night of her murder, and one
witness testified that he saw a car similar to the defendant's dis-
tinctive car around the time of the murder and at the scene where
the police eventually found the declarant's body. 237 Other physical
evidence also incriminated the defendant.2 3 8 All these facts corrob-
orated the declarant's statement and increased the likelihood that
she carried out her intention to date Frank on the night of the
murder. The majority ruled that the deceased declarant's state-
ments were admissible against the defendant: "The cumulation of
facts corroborative of the guilt of the defendant was sufficient to
indicate that the trial court did not err in admitting the declara-
tion."239 In his dissent Justice Traynor cited the overwhelming
prejudice and inability of the jury to comply with the limiting in-
struction as reasons to exclude the declarant's statements.4 0 He
also questioned the statements' relevance because there was "no
dispute as to the identity of the deceased or as to where she was at
the time of her death... [so that] no legitimate purpose could be
served by admitting her declarations of what she intended to do
[that] evening. '24 1
Justice Traynor's reasoning is particularly persuasive because
the existence of other corroborating evidence obviates the tradi-
(Hilimon statement "would also corroborate... testimony that the defendant had stated
that the shooting must be accomplished quickly because the victim 'wanted to cancel the
policies or get out.' "), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 911 (1976); Hayes v. State, 395 So. 2d 127, 144
(Ala. Crim. App. 1980) (witnesses saw deceased declarant dancing with defendant on night
of murder; statement that she and "'the good looking guy she was dancing with,' who by all
fair inferences was the [defendant], . . . might 'pull off on the side of the road'" admissi-
ble); State v. Cugliata, 372 A.2d 1019, 1028 (Me.) ("evidence independent of the hearsay
corroborated its accuracy"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 856 (1977); State v. Thornton, 38 N.J.
380, 389, 186 A.2d 9, 14 (1962) ("A realistic inference is that she intended to visit her hus-
band because she thought he was sick. And the fact of her later presence there provides
adequate support for the inference."), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 816 (1963); State v. Vestal, 278
N.C. 561, 583, 180 S.E.2d 755, 770 (1971) (defendant himself corroborated deceased declar-
ant's statement of intent to visit him).
235. 24 Cal. 2d 177, 148 P.2d 627 (1944); see supra notes 113-22 and accompanying
text.
236. 24 Cal. 2d at 181, 148 P.2d at 628.
237. Id., 148 P.2d at 628-29.
238. Id. at 181-82, 148 P.2d at 629.
239. Id. at 188, 148 P.2d at 632.
240. Id. at 190, 148 P.2d at 633 (Traynor, J., dissenting).
241. Id., 148 P.2d at 633.
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tional justification for Hillmon statements-necessity.4 2 There-
fore, corroborating evidence reduces greatly the probative force of
the declaration and the ostensible purpose for admitting it to
prove that the declarant actually carried out her stated intention.
Independent evidence of that fact arguably makes the statement of
intention cumulative and the risks of prejudice that would result
from its admission both unnecessary and unfair to the defendant.
Thus, courts that have conscientiously required corroborative evi-
dence before allowing Hillmon statements into evidence have un-
wittingly and needlessly exposed the defendant to the dangers this
requirement seeks to avoid. Because these statements create such
great risks, if corroborative evidence exists that tends to prove the
same material fact, a court should consider excluding the Hillmon
statement and avoid this anomalous result.
D. Rule 403: Prejudice
Once the court resolves these questions in favor of admissibil-
ity-whether the statement refers to past or present conduct;
whether the statement is relevant to a material fact in issue; and
what effect corroborative evidence has on the admissibility of the
statement-it must evaluate one more question: whether admis-
sion of a Hillmon statement that implicates the conduct of the de-
fendant prejudices his right to a fair trial.2 43 Rule 403 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence defines the formula to answer this
challenge: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its pro-
bative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
242. See supra notes 35-58 and accompanying text. Declarations of a person's state of
mind often are the only evidence available.
243. The purpose of the rule against hearsay is to exclude incompetent evidence, that
is, evidence which the jury should not consider because it is inherently unreliable. See au-
thorities cited supra note 3. Allowing the jury to consider incompetent evidence would
prejudice the defendant's right to a fair trial.
In their treatise Weinstein and Berger suggest that rule 403 should apply to a Hillmon
statement
if the judge finds that the statement was made in circumstances which do not negate
the presence of a motive to misrepresent, and the inference to be drawn that the de-
clarant acted in a particular way is highly prejudicial. . . . In reaching this decision,
the possibility of bad faith [by the declarant] is but one factor for the judge to con-
sider. He must weigh all the factors on both sides of the equation-those affecting
relevancy (such as the legitimacy of the inference from statement of intent to act) and
those bearing on the dangers stemming from admission (as, for example, whether this
is a civil or criminal case).
4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 3, 803(3)[04], at 803-108. Other commentators
recognized that prejudice to the defendant might result in the admission of a Hillmon state-
ment. See, e.g., C. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, at 699-700; Maguire, supra note 39, at 718.
1982]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
prejudice ... " 4 Professor Maguire suggested several points of
inquiry that a court should make when examining the reliability of
a Hillmon statement "because it is not customary to accept one
man's extra-judicial assertions as evidence of another's mental
state. 2
4 5
No simple formula can solve all variations. It will be necessary to consider the
amount of cooperation required from the other person involved by the decla-
rations; the difficulty or ease of obtaining from him such cooperation; the
emotional or other impulses tempting the triers of fact to swallow the decla-
rations whole; and sundry additional matters peculiar to each case."4 6
Implicit in Maguire's cautious approval of the Hillmon doctrine is
the recognition that in considering a statement of intention that
implicates the defendant, a jury often may not be able to confine
the statement's impact only to proof of inference of the declarant's
acts. Of course, the court's limiting instructions will direct the jury
to confine its consideration of the evidence accordingly. 24 7
The efficacy of limiting instructions in restricting the jury's
consideration of Hillmon evidence is difficult to determine. The
Advisory Committee's explanatory note to rule 403 expressly in-
cludes this consideration as part of the court's analysis of the po-
tential prejudicial effect relevant evidence might have on the
jury.24 8 Moreover, the Committee also stated that the "availability
of other means of proof may also be an appropriate factor."'24 ' Us-
ing a rule 403 analysis, the court should examine Hilimon state-
ments on a case by case basis since the facts of each case and the
relative importance of each statement will determine the admissi-
bility of the statement. When the Hilimon statement plays an inte-
gral role in the "larger matrix of circumstantial proof ' 250 against
the defendant, this Note concludes that a limiting instruction to
the jury will not prevent it from making the inference which the
244. FED. R. EVID. 403.
245. Maguire, supra note 39, at 717.
246. Id. at 719.
247. "Despite the danger that juries will be neither willing nor able to make the dis-
tinction, courts have tended to admit the statements in these cases with limiting instruc-
tions directing the jury to consider them only on the issue of the declarant's actions." C.
MCCORMICK, supra note 3, at 699. For an example of a jury instruction, see supra note 218.
248. "In reaching a decision whether to exclude on grounds of unfair prejudice, consid-
eration should be given to the probable effectiveness or lack of effectiveness of a limiting
instruction." FED. R. EvID. 403 advisory committee note.
249. Id. Thus, the availability of corroborative evidence reduces the probative force of
the potentially prejudicial statement, and "the danger of unfair prejudice" consequently
outweighs the relevant, but prejudicial, evidence even more.
250. Maguire, supra note 39, at 717.
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prosecution really intends it to make: that the defendant acted in
conformity with or in response to the declarant's stated intention.
This conclusion is not the result of mistrust for the jury or skepti-
cism for its ability. Indeed, "[ilt is difficult to believe that even the
trained mind of a psychoanalyst could thus departmentalize itself
sufficiently to obey the mandate of the limiting instruction. Cer-
tainly a lay mind could not do so.''251 Many courts and commenta-
tors disagree with this view and instead rely upon the perceived
ability of today's jury.252 Furthermore, the burden of proof require-
ment arguably ensures that any prejudice caused by the admission
of a Hillmon statement will not result in the conviction of the de-
fendant.253 This justification, however, ignores the tainted jury ver-
dict that misuse of a Hillmon statement as proof of the defen-
dant's conduct would cause: the jury could use the statement as
direct evidence to bolster an otherwise weak case. Rule 403 was
designed to prevent this kind of prejudice to the defendant.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Note has examined the use of the common-law Hillmon
doctrine and rule 803(3) in a limited context. Several approaches
are available to a court that considers whether to admit a Hillmon
statement. A court in a jurisdiction that still applies the common-
law hearsay rule may adhere to the status quo. Ample authority
exists to permit this approach. Nevertheless, because admission of
a Hillmon statement risks certain inherent dangers, a common-law
court should avoid a perfunctory application of the exception. In-
251. People v. Hamilton, 55 Cal. 2d 881, 896, 362 P.2d 473, 481, 13 Cal. Rptr. 649, 657
(1961) (footnote omitted) (statements referring to past acts inadmissible but those referring
to future conduct admissible).
252. See., e.g., id. at 904, 362 P.2d at 487, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 663 (dissenting opinion)
("To me it seems a sad commentary upon the intelligence of jurors, in the light of the
court's constant, painstaking and specific admonitions, to say that they were unable to fol-
low them or that in violation of their sworn obligations as jurors they cast aside such admo-
nition."). See also 1 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BEROR, supra note 3, which states,
Universality of education and the almost instantaneous disposal of information
through modern technology have created a citizenry with a remarkable and historically
unique breadth of knowledge, perception and sophistication. These mature men and
women should be treated with the respect they deserve. Excluding information on the
ground that jurors are too ignorant or emotional to evaluate it properly may have been
appropriate in England at a time when a rigid class society created a wide gap between
royal judges and commoner jurors, but it is inconsistent with the realities of modern
American informed society and the responsibilities of independent thought in a work-
ing democracy.
Id. at iii.
253. See, e.g., C. McCoRMICK, supra note 3, at 701.
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stead, the court must examine carefully each Hillmon statement to
ensure that it does not prejudice the defendant's right to a fair
trial. Part V suggested that such an analysis includes consideration
of (1) the past/future distinction; (2) the statement's relevance to a
material issue in the case; (3) the existence of corroborative evi-
dence; and (4) the risk of potential prejudice. Although most
courts likely will resolve these questions in favor of admissibility,
the analysis provides a court bound by a jurisdictional rule through
stare decisis a basis upon which to exclude certain Hillmon state-
ments when the facts of the case warrant it. All courts must im-
pose the Shepard limitation on Hillmon statements; both common
law and rule 803(3) mandate confining the exception to statements
of intention that point only toward future conduct. The continued
vitality of the rule against hearsay necessitates strict compliance
with this requirement.
In the federal courts and in those states that have adopted
rule 803(3), a court may accept either the majority or minority ap-
proach. The common-law precedent and the Advisory Committee's
explanatory note to rule 803(3) provide a solid foundation for the
continued application of the Hillmon doctrine to statements of in-
tention that implicate the conduct of the defendant. This majority
approach will continue to prevail in the future because of its long-
standing precedent. Courts that apply this approach, however,
should also scrutinize each Hillmon statement under the analysis
suggested in part V.
Finally, a court may adopt a jurisdictional rule limiting the
application of the Hillmon doctrine as codified by rule 803(3) to
statements of intention that refer only to the conduct of the de-
clarant. This restriction of the Hillmon doctrine has considerable
support. First, the dangers risked by the admission of a Hillmon
statement warrant this restriction. Second, the House Judiciary
Committee issued the only statement of legislative intent and it
expressly noted that the purpose of rule 803(3) is to limit the scope
of the Hillmon doctrine to the minority view. The Committee
heard testimony that contained this limitation. Last, since 1892
when the Supreme Court first developed the common-law Hillmon
doctrine, other exceptions have evolved that greatly expanded the
categorical exemptions from the exclusionary rule and have less-
ened the need for the broad Hillmon exception. The residual ex-
ception, which is available under the Federal Rules, is particularly
applicable to a statement of intention implicating the conduct of
the defendant but outside the minority application of the doc-
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trine.25" This exception forces both coi'nsel and the court to engage
in a considered analysis of such a statement and requires notice to
the opponent to afford him the opportunity to demonstrate that
the statement is not trustworthy. Because Hillmon statements that
implicate the conduct of the defendant may prejudice his right to a
fair trial, courts should scrutinize them in the manner prescribed
by the residual exception rather than admit them under rule
803(3) without careful analysis.
THOMAS A. WISEMAN, III
254. FED. R. EvID. 803(24). The exception states,
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is avail-
able as a witness:...
(24) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing
exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the
court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of material fact; (B)
the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other
evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the
general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by
admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted
under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party
sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair
opportunity to prepare to meet it, his intention to offer the statement and the partic-
ulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant.
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